Russia's hybrid warfare campaign in Europe
Russia is alleged to be conducting a campaign of hybrid warfare across Europe.
There is no universally accepted definition for hybrid warfare, or what are commonly referred to as “grey zone” operations. In January 2025, the former head of MI6 Sir Alex Younger described the hybrid threat from hostile states or non-state actors as “everything that stays below the threshold of war…from disinformation to sabotage to cyber or economic coercion… [whatever] offers the adversary the opportunity to achieve its security objectives in a way that is short of armed conflict”.
Assessment of the Russian hybrid threatSuch threats are not new, but they are becoming more sophisticated and intense, facilitated by the pace of technological change.
Russia has long been accused by Western countries, including the UK, of using “sophisticated hybrid strategies” to destabilise the international system in pursuit of its strategic interests and to undermine Western support for Ukraine. To achieve its goals, the Kremlin has been accused, among other things, of:
- interfering in democratic elections
- conducting and/ or sponsoring malicious cyber activities
- targeting Russian dissidents overseas (including in the UK)
- sabotaging critical national infrastructure, industry and logistical supply chains, increasingly through the use of proxies
- mapping the critical national infrastructure of NATO allies and entering EU and NATO airspace and territorial waters
- Imposing or threatening economic sanctions on states as a means of coercion
- weaponising migration
- pursuing disinformation campaigns as a means of undermining adversaries
- politicising energy and food supplies, including the use of a shadow fleet to circumvent energy sanctions.
Russia’s campaign of instability is considered by NATO and several European intelligence agencies to be escalating. Incidents of alleged Russian sabotage, criminal damage, disinformation, and aggressive military tactics and rhetoric are becoming more commonplace, as is the use of proxies to conduct low-level activities in EU and NATO countries on behalf of the Russian state.
Speaking to the European Parliament Committee on Security and Defence at the end of September 2026, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander General Alexus Grynkewich, warned of “growing instability across NATO’s periphery”. He said there had been a “quantitative and qualitative increase” in Russian hybrid activities and that “state-directed sabotage is growing increasingly brazen”. A report from the Danish Defence Intelligence Service in September 2026 shared the assessment that Russia has “become more willing to take risks” (PDF).
The UK’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review called Russia “an immediate and pressing threat”. In a speech in September 2026, the First Sea Lord, General Sir Gwyn Jenkins, said that the UK was facing threats not seen since the Cold War and that “among Ukraine’s western allies, Russia considers us [the UK] to be one of its greatest foes”.
Russia continues to deny that it is conducting a campaign of hybrid activity across Europe.
How has Europe and the UK been responding?Responding to an ambiguous threat is a recognised challenge. European allies within NATO and the EU have been taking steps to collectively address the Russian threat, but it is widely acknowledged that the response is one which must constantly evolve.
NATONATO has been working to strengthen its collective defence, including the challenges posed by hybrid and information threats, since 2014. NATO has adapted its military posture and launched enhanced vigilance operations in Eastern Europe, the Baltics and the Arctic. Hybrid attacks, including cyber attacks, are considered to fall within NATO’s article 5 (an attack on one ally is an attack on all), which triggers an alliance-wide obligation of assistance which may or may not involve the use of armed force.
However, there is no precise NATO definition of what constitutes an article 5 attack. Discussing the hybrid threat in September 2026, the NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said that article 5 was “deliberately ambiguous”. However, Russia’s intensifying campaign of hybrid activity across Europe has led many commentators to call for greater clarity from NATO.
EUThe EU has established a “hybrid toolbox” of political, diplomatic, economic and military tools to facilitate cooperation and the sharing of best practice between EU member states, and to coordinate a collective response to hybrid threats, including from Russia.
However, there have been increasing calls for a more overt EU response. In her State of the Union Address in September 2026, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said that EU doctrine, institutions and decision making in this area had become outdated, and that the EU needed its own “counter-hybrid playbook”, including a new Emergency Security Protocol, akin to NATO’s article 4, which enables NATO allies to request formal consultations on issues of national security.
Many, including the European Parliament, have welcomed a firmer EU response to the hybrid threat. However, some observers have warned against the EU “overstepping its security role” and duplicating existing EU and NATO mechanisms.
UK actionSince the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the UK has stepped up its response to the Russian threat. National security legislation has been strengthened, extensive sanctions have been imposed on Russia, the government has set out significant increases in defence spending to 2029/2030 and in 2025 published a National Security Strategy and a Strategic Defence Review which outlined a new approach to defence and security over the next decade. Work on homeland defence and resilience is also being accelerated by the government.