My Lords, it is an extraordinary honour to open this debate, and I am grateful to all the clever people, from the Bingham Centre to the Constitution Unit, who have helped me prepare for it. But a written constitution is not a subject only for initiates. This debate is on the syllabus of every student of law and of politics, at university and at school. It concerns every citizen, including the 12 and 13 year-olds whom many of us have met during this Parliament through Learn with the Lords, and who, as things stand, will have a vote at the next general election. Those who will speak after me have unrivalled experience in how our constitution works in England and in the devolved nations—not only as parliamentarians but as judges, Ministers, party leaders, civil servants, constitutional watchdogs, an intelligence chief, and behind the door of Number 10. I suspect we are in for a treat.
The constitutional arrangements of this country are unusual in two respects. Almost uniquely in the world, they are not codified, although many of them are written down, and they are founded on a particularly strong version of parliamentary sovereignty—the principle that, as Chief Justice Holt put it in 1701,
“an Act of Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several things that look pretty odd”.
People who support a written constitution tend to do so for one or more of three reasons, which I shall describe in ascending order of ambition as clarification, entrenchment and the driving of change. To start with clarification, a written constitution would demystify what the journalist Gavin Esler has described as the
“smoke, mirrors and glorious verbiage”
of our constitutional arrangements. It would set out principles, powers and conventions for all to see. Arrived at by an inclusive process of public debate, led by a constitutional convention, prefaced by an inspiring statement of values and eventually endorsed by Parliament or by popular vote, it would aspire to foster trust and encourage a sense of involvement, cohesion and pride in country.
I am very privileged to follow the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. When he started his speech, I thought I would disagree with him, but by the time he finished I agreed with every word he said. He mentioned the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, as it stands, and it is now dealing with vulnerabilities and threats to our constitution.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, talked about how students were once taught about the British constitution. I taught just that in the 1970s and early 1980s. In the first lecture the students were completely bewildered when I said that there was no constitution to teach them. They thought there was. Over the following 18 months to two years—as we went through everything from the monarch to the judiciary to Parliament, and everything else that constitutes a Government and Parliament in this country—they began to realise that we did indeed have a constitution. Some of it was written; some of it was convention; some of it was historical; some of it was good; and some of it was bad. But what it was not was a written constitution.
Over recent years, as the Constitution Committee will undoubtedly report, there have been threats and vulnerabilities to our constitution, not least of which is the rise of populism. Who knows what might happen if a hard-right Government took over? The Reform Party has already said what it would do, and it is not on its own. Would a written constitution stop it? I am not sure it would—that the constitution as we see it is strong enough to withstand those threats. It is very important that we try to change it where it needs to be changed, in the way we have done for many years. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has touched on the ways in which we can strengthen our constitution without going to the extent of writing it all down as a complete written constitution.
The noble Lord rightly mentioned the Cabinet Manual. At the moment, it is relatively worthless because it is entirely based on the whim of a Prime Minister. The only way it could be made absolutely perfect would be to codify it in law, through statute. The Constitution Committee will probably look at that in further detail. Look at the way in which Members of our House are appointed. The committee which appoints them is not statutory in the sense that it can do what it wants; it is still at the whim of a Prime Minister. Perhaps that could be codified and put into law to improve our constitution.
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen. Unfortunately, I am no more able to agree with him today than I was during the many years we served together in the other place.
I have only one point to make. The one certain effect of the adoption of a written constitution would be the transfer of power from elected parliamentarians to unelected judges. This is because under a written constitution, the final word on our laws would rest with the judges. Under our present arrangements, if the courts interpret the law in a way Parliament considers undesirable, Parliament can legislate to put matters right if it so chooses. Under a written constitution, it would have to amend the constitution—a process which, by design, would be made very difficult.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, in his opening sought to circumvent this by suggesting that you could have a watered down written constitution which would not quite have the effect I have just described. But the whole point of a written constitution is, to a greater or lesser extent, to hamstring the sovereignty of Parliament and that is what I consider undesirable.
Of course, democracy is not perfect, and of course, it does not always deliver the verdict that any of us might want, but if those who are elected fail to deliver what they were elected to do, they can be ejected from power and replaced by others. Democracy is, in a real, literal sense, power to the people. If an extreme totalitarian Government were elected—which I believe would never happen in this country—does anyone think they would be deterred from pursuing their agenda by the niceties of a written constitution, any more than the Russian Government, just mentioned, are deterred by the provisions of Russia’s written constitution?
Of course, there are some, not least some judges themselves, who regard judges as the ultimate personification of all that is noble, wise and good—in contrast to mere politicians, who have to pander to the demands of the electorate, or, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, put it, with the faintest hint of disparagement, day-to-day politics. They may well be right in their characterisation of judges that I have just described, but judges are not elected, nor should they be. That is why they should not be granted the ultimate power, which a written constitution would confer upon them.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Howard. I start by assuring him that I am not one of those judges who would seek to accrete further power to the judiciary. As the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, reminded us, he is a member of the Constitution Committee, as am I, but I speak in a personal capacity this afternoon. I have also been asked to convey the regrets of our chairman, the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, that he is unable to be here this afternoon.
The merits of a written constitution over an unwritten one such as ours are the stuff of endless discussion. However, before any profound change is proposed, there must be a hard-hearted look at what is wrong with the existing system, whether a written constitution would solve the problems identified, and whether it is feasible to produce one. All constitutions are vulnerable to bad actors. Examples abound around the world of Governments abusing their constitutions. As the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, reminded us, many of the most authoritarian countries have constitutions that look beautiful on paper but are worthless. A written constitution is generally only as good as the ability of a constitutional court independently to interpret it and declare conduct or legislation unconstitutional and that of the Government to comply with the court’s rulings.
Alexander Hamilton, a founding father of the United States and a draftsman of its constitution, observed that the judiciary is the weakest of the three arms of the state because it requires the executive to enforce its orders. This explains why so many Governments, including some in Europe in recent years, have sought to pack the judiciary with their placemen and remove others. A written constitution, in the end, provides only limited protection from bad actors.
As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, reminded us, written constitutions usually arise in circumstances of political upheaval and change—sometimes peaceful, such as when new states are created, but often not. The United Kingdom is simply not in that position. Our constitutional settlement followed the Civil War, the restoration of the Stuarts and the Glorious Revolution, and it has constantly evolved since. Aspects of it are contained in legislation, but much of it is not. It is hedged around with conventions. As has already been noted, at its heart is parliamentary sovereignty. That is a key aspect of our constitutional settlement, and it necessarily includes the proposition that Parliament cannot bind its successors. Any legislation can be repealed or amended—including constitutional legislation.
My Lords, I speak with some hesitancy, given the expertise of many speakers in this debate. I will not talk for long; I want to say just a few things. I always believed that our constitution was flexible and adaptable, and preserved the sovereignty of Parliament. I can remember a conversation with the President of the Supreme Court many years ago about whether we need a written constitution. He said that in 1930, if you looked at constitutions of Europe, you would have said that Germany had the best one. We have seen other examples and other speakers have shown the fallacy of relying on a beautiful constitution.
Of course, the events with the Prorogation of Parliament and others worried us; they certainly worried me. I note, in particular, the Daily Mail story on “enemies of the people”. My father filled all the major law roles of the Crown: Solicitor-General, Attorney-General and Lord Chancellor. He always told me that he tried to do those jobs in a quasi-judicial way, not a party-political way. For example, he objected to Suez on the grounds of its illegality. He also told me that he took an oath to defend the judges if they were attacked. That has not recently happened, and the person in the role of Lord Chancellor or the Minister of Justice should defend the judges. We do not have to agree with all the judgments or all their decisions, but if we do not resist any imputation of the independence of the judiciary, we are in real trouble. A recent Attorney-General had a spad; this is completely wrong in my view.
I have twice chaired committees to appoint the chair of the Judicial Appointments Commission, which was established by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. In each case, I came under some pressure from politicians to reach a certain outcome, which the panel resisted. In MI5, which is slightly different, there were occasions under both Labour and Conservative Governments when we were asked why we were not looking at a particular subject, to which the answer was that, constitutionally, the Government can stop MI5 doing anything—they can sack it, abolish it, sack the leader or refuse to authorise anything—but they cannot tell it what to do any more than they can tell the police who to arrest or investigate. In each case, both for the appointment of the chair of the JAC and in my MI5 experience, when this was explained, Ministers backed off and the constitutional niceties were preserved.
My Lords, this is the first substantive contribution I have made to the work of this House since 2012, when I was disqualified from sitting here by virtue of the Constitutional Reform Act—one of a slew of recent judicial constitutional measures that demonstrate the evolving nature of the constitution. Reference has already been made to the work of the devolved Governments and Parliaments. These are important changes that have been made to the constitutional order through the present arrangements.
In principle, a written constitution is not necessarily a bad idea. It may have a number of advantages. In practice, however, those who propose such a document rather underestimate the time and energy that would be entailed by such an exercise, to say nothing of the political controversy that would surround it. To take one example, do the nations of the United Kingdom have the power to secede? If so, on what terms and by what means?
In my submission, the issue is not whether we should have a written constitution but whether we have and maintain the conventions, norms and shared values that support our democracy. The noble Lord, Lord Murphy, referred to the constitution of the USSR. Article 112 of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union states:
“Judges are independent and subject only to the law”.
If one looked at that and knew nothing about the Soviet Union, one might think that it had an independent judiciary and was committed to the rule of law. Nothing, of course, could be further from the truth.
I submit that the conventions, norms and shared values, the respect for those whose opinions differ from ours, and the respect for human rights and human dignity are of more significance than whether we have a written document. If we look across the Atlantic to the United States—a nation whose commitment to a written constitution is, in effect, forged into its very soul—we can see what happens when these values are challenged. There are too many examples, I suggest, that question its commitment, at least under this Administration, to the values I just outlined.
My Lords, I begin with two quick points. First, to share my noble friend Lord Murphy’s point, we came to the fray expecting to hear solid advocacy for a written constitution and had prepared the finest speeches imaginable against such a proposition, whereas it has not turned out that way at all. Secondly, I had not imagined that I would be speaking at this point in the debate, with all those extraordinarily learned people with huge experience of law immediately ahead of me. Your Lordships must therefore regard my remarks as an entreacte, a little bit of entertainment, between now and when the great heavyweights come on again later.
I want to make a point about written constitutions, whether of the kind that is in the head of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, as he brought the debate before us, or otherwise. I come from a theological angle—I can see your eyes glazing—with a consideration of, for example, the 500 years it took the Christian church, after the death of Christ, to formulate the Nicene Creed. It celebrated its 1,700th anniversary just last year. To get a form of words that satisfied everybody—it was an attempt to bring an experience out of a Semitic world into a Hellenic world—was itself a challenge, but with the Hellenic, there were a variety of ways of speaking Greek in Alexandria, Jerusalem, Ephesus and other places that demanded only the best intellects, put together to take out of all that something that they could all live with. It went on year after year, decade after decade and century after century. In the end, the great force that brought it into being was a contingent of troops from the Pope in Rome, who put a shotgun—or its equivalent in the fifth century—to the heads of all those gathered for the formulation of the creed.
Those were all the elements going into the attempts to make a written constitution which would bind the Roman Empire, or what remained of it, together. There were more people excluded from Christendom by the creed than included. However, let me move on 500 years, because at that particular time, in the 11th century, there was a proposal to add one word in Latin to the Nicene Creed: filioque. That itself proved so divisive with this written constitution that it divided the whole of Christendom between east and west, Orthodox and Latin. Written constitutions are for the birds. I admire the Nicene Creed, its intellectual process that gave us that form of words and satisfied people for a long time, but it is a historic document. I have never used it—I can say that now only because the Bishops are not here—but, for all that, that is my experience of a written constitution.
My Lords, our uncodified constitution has four legs—short or long: common law, statutes, conventions and practice. Our modern system of administrative law, elicited from our well-respected Government Legal Service, has a measured guide, The Judge Over Your Shoulder, now in its sixth edition. Its witty acronym is JOYS, but I take this in the sense that it is a real joy, and a huge privilege, to live in a country which adheres to the rule of law.
An important aspect of the courts’ role is to determine the legal limits of the powers conferred upon each branch of government. In the two Miller cases, in the first of which I sat, the Supreme Court acted to preserve the position of Parliament, not the Executive, as our ultimate democratic institution.
Where our uncodified constitution stands out is in a certain lack of transparency, possibly accompanied with a degree of complacency, in its inability to act as a salient feature of national identity—it mystifies—and in its foundational principles of parliamentary sovereignty and privilege, the relationship of which with the other Diceyan principle of rule of law we are discussing this evening.
As for transparency, there has been reference to the Cabinet Manual. In 2008-09, when I had the privilege of chairing the House’s sub-committee on European law and institutions, on which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, also served, we were interested to know the bases on which the Government chose to consult the House in respect of European legislative initiatives in Brussels. Our information was that in at least one Nordic country, its parliament was not merely consulted but dictated the Executive’s line on such initiatives, which are of course a form of primary legislation in many cases. The response to our inquiry was that the Cabinet Office guidelines were confidential. Only on 5 May 2009 were we able to thank the then Minister for Europe, Caroline Flint, for a letter putting several of the guidelines for the first time into the public domain. Now, of course, we have the Cabinet Manual of December 2010, but it has not even been updated to reflect our leaving the EU—although it is about to be, apparently, reformulated.
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Entrenchment would involve taking vital protections that currently exist only in precedent, in convention or in statute, and placing them beyond the reach of day-to-day politics by including them in a written constitution that could be changed only with a higher-than-usual degree of political or popular consensus. A desire for greater certainty was expressed in evidence given last month to your Lordships’ Constitution Committee on relations between Cabinet Secretaries and Prime Ministers. The noble Lord, Lord O’Donnell, seems to have found such meetings occasionally frustrating, commenting that:
“A precedent is a precedent until someone decides to do something else … I would love to have been able to say, ‘Well, Prime Minister, that is not such a good idea because it is illegal’.
Perhaps greater clarity could assist Ministers, too. Darren Jones MP, until recently Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister, recalled this week in evidence to another committee:
“I would be told all the time that there were things I could not do because of the constitution”.
The noble Lord, Lord Case, who served as Cabinet Secretary to four Prime Ministers, took things a step further in his evidence to the Constitution Committee. He pointed to the waning persuasive force of precedents and conventions against unconstitutional behaviour. A backstop, he said, was needed. After what he described as “a rather long journey”, he had eventually concluded that
“probably the best backstop is a written constitution”.
Most ambitiously of all, some proponents of a written constitution see it as a vehicle for whatever major change they may favour: removal of the royal prerogative, electoral reform, a new second Chamber, the remaking of the United Kingdom on federal lines, or the abolition of the monarchy. Andy Burnham argued last year in his book Head North for a written constitution that would echo the German Basic Law by providing for “equivalent living standards” between the different nations and regions of the United Kingdom. He has repeated that call since becoming Prime Minister, perhaps uniquely. I look forward to hearing from the Minister what he meant by that and what government policy is on a written constitution.
On the other side of the debate, it is common to hear reasons why a written constitution could never happen or would be pointless if it did. Some of those reasons are to my mind not wholly convincing. It is sometimes said that a written constitution is against the traditions of this country or the common law. But the Government of Ireland Act functioned as a written constitution for Northern Ireland for over 50 years, and the current devolution statutes operate as written constitutions for the devolved institutions of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Our Westminster model of parliamentary democracy has been codified, with multiple variations, in nearly all our former colonies. Indeed, I learned the other day that the drafting of new constitutions for Commonwealth states is still one of our legal exports, although rather a niche one. We even have state-of-the-art judicial expertise in interpreting constitutions through the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and through a Supreme Court which performs constitutional review when it deals with challenges to the validity of delegated legislation.
Another frequently heard objection to a written constitution is that it would be bound to empower the judges to set aside Acts of Parliament, placing our elected representatives at the mercy of the lawyers. Well, courts are the most dispassionate arbiters we have, and it would certainly make sense for them to interpret any constitution, but we would not need to go down the path taken by our American cousins, of whom Alexis de Tocqueville so appositely said, almost 200 years ago, that
“there is scarcely any political question that does not, sooner or later, turn into a judicial one”.
Any part of any constitution could be placed expressly off limits to the courts—a course taken in Part IX of the Constitutional Consolidation Act that was drafted for the Public Administration and Constitutional Reform Committee of the House of Commons in 2014. The higher courts, or the Supreme Court only, could be empowered to issue a declaration of unconstitutionality, serving as an invitation to government rather than a binding instruction—a solution not without precedent and fully consistent with parliamentary sovereignty. Or inspiration could be taken from countries such as Sweden and Finland, whose written constitutions are enforced primarily by parliamentary committees rather than the courts. We could even, if we wished, choose to emulate the Netherlands, whose constitution by its Article 120 simply prohibits constitutional review by the courts.
Another frequently heard objection to a written constitution, generally accompanied these days by an injunction to look across the Atlantic, is that, however fine its words, such a document can do nothing in practice to prevent a slide towards authoritarianism. That point is overstated. It is true that careful balances of power can fall out of kilter. No written constitution could be a complete defence against leaders who seek persistently to undermine it, or a population which has stopped caring for the values of pluralist democracy. But recent experience in America and in Europe shows that, while the tide may attack the foundations of any constitution, that constitution may still educate us to recognise the attack, measure the extent of the damage, and slow its advance while we wait for the tide to turn.
So I suggest that some of the supposed barriers to a written constitution are illusory. But this does not mean we will be writing one any time soon. History shows that new constitutional settlements come only at constitutional moments, times of national convulsion. We have certainly had our moments over the past decade, not least Brexit and the election of nationalist-led Governments in each of the devolved nations. But the constitution putters on, with “expensive noises coming from the engine”, in the phrase of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, but with only muted calls for fundamental change. For this, something still more dramatic would be required—a civil war or a revolution, perhaps—and one would need to be a very keen proponent of a written constitution to welcome that.
There is another point, too. We are living through a period of rapid constitutional change. In just a few years, EU membership, fixed-term Parliaments, English votes for English laws and hereditary Peers have gone. New mayoral authorities have been created and the structure for relations between Westminster and the devolved Governments has been refreshed. Changes to English devolution and the Westminster voting system may soon be in contemplation. The information revolution poses urgent questions to ancient institutions and procedures. Looking back, the ease with which it has been possible to change our uncodified constitution has surely been an asset. If we can hold on to that while preserving the values that really matter, we will not have done badly.
So I suggest that this is not the time to divert our energies into the process of attempting a codified written constitution. However, the flexible nature of our constitutional framework, its unusual reliance on parliamentary sovereignty and the relatively limited powers of our courts place a heavy burden on Parliament to protect and promote constitutional values. Here are four suggestions for building on what we have.
First, we could clarify our current arrangements. The House of Commons Library launched in 2024, and updates monthly, a lengthy summary entitled The United Kingdom Constitution—A Mapping Exercise. This could evolve with academic help into an authoritative but non-binding restatement of the constitution, and there could be a miniature version focusing on principles rather than detail, perhaps endorsed by the constitutional committees of each House for use as a teaching aid in schools and a public point of reference.
We should also build on the Government’s recent decision to update the Cabinet Manual, the document inspired by the New Zealand equivalent and first published in 2011, which sets out the main laws, rules and conventions affecting the operation of government. It is excellent news that PACAC in the Commons and our own Constitution Committee are to be consulted on the revisions. The Cabinet Manual should be a document acceptable to Parliament, not just the Civil Service. Heeding the calls for certainty in the recent evidence of the noble Lords, Lord O’Donnell and Lord Case, we might also consider the case for giving statutory force to some of its elements.
Thirdly, a clear distinction should be made between common-or-garden quangos, of which there may well be too many, and those of real constitutional significance. I think of the Judicial Appointments Commission, our guarantor of judicial independence and everything that flows from judicial independence, which it is disturbing to see major political parties proposing to abolish in favour of a more political appointments system. Other watchdogs, such as HOLAC, the independent Commissioner for Public Appointments and the Independent Adviser on Ministerial Standards, might also be candidates for a statutory lock. These are important bulwarks against favouritism and corruption, and a future Government should not be able to throw them on the next bonfire without at the very least having to justify that decision to Parliament.
Fourthly, the Constitution Committee published last May a codified summary of the legislative standards that it applies in its scrutiny of pending Bills. I declare an interest as a member of the committee at that time. It would be good to see that referred to in the reports of the committee and the debates of this House and, better still, if it could be integrated into the guidance supplied by parliamentary counsel and, within government, by the Parliamentary Business and Legislation Committee. The quality of legislation is a vital component of the constitutional principle of the rule of law, and these vital standards need to be given both greater weight and more consistency in their application.
I finish with a word on human rights. Whether these are derived from the ECHR or from a domestic Bill of Rights, any imaginable constitution for the United Kingdom must surely have at its centre a catalogue of individual rights against public authorities. Courts must be able not only to defend the fundamental liberties of the individual against the excesses of official power but also, as a minimum, to register their formal concern should those rights be infringed by the operation of statute. The genius of the Human Rights Act is that it achieves those outcomes by means of the declaration of incompatibility without in any way affecting the sovereignty of Parliament. If we ever lose the right of recourse to the European Court of Human Rights, we will be still more reliant on the continued power of our own courts to pronounce on violations of our liberties, including when those violations result from the application of statute.
A codified constitution may be no more than a pipe dream for now, but let us ensure that the liberties of the individual remain front and centre of our constitutional settlement, whatever that settlement may look like. I beg to move.
What I am particularly interested in, as a Welsh Member of this House and someone who spent his entire ministerial career in the territorial departments, is how devolution has changed the nature of our constitution over the last 30 years. The constitutional and political landscape has completely changed. All three of the Governments and Parliaments in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland were set up by statute and then confirmed by referenda. Indeed, I took the Northern Ireland Act 1998 through the House of Commons, and that Act is effectively a constitution for the running of Northern Ireland. There have been other Acts since which have clarified different things, but that Act and the similar Acts for Wales and Scotland—incidentally, they said that sovereignty was vested in the people, which is something quite different from what we have heard in the past—formed the basis of the constitution of those countries.
However, they are in a sense themselves under threat. In Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast, the Governments of those countries are now effectively in the hands of nationalists. Of course, they are perfectly legitimate political parties. In Northern Ireland it is not as simple, as it is half and half, but the First Minister is Sinn Féin. In Edinburgh, the First Minister is SNP and in Cardiff the First Minister is Plaid Cymru. All parties are committed to independence. What happens if they have a referendum in each of those countries? In Northern Ireland, it would be the border poll, and it would be a referendum in Scotland and in Wales. If that happens, we will not be talking about a British constitution but an English constitution. That is a severe threat to the constitution of our country of the United Kingdom which needs to be taken very much into account.
Soviet Russia under Joseph Stalin had a constitution. It guaranteed all the rights of freedom of the press, freedom of association and the rest of it. It was entirely fiction—worthless. It does not mean to say, if you have a written constitution, that it protects anything if someone is going to overthrow it by coup or some other method.
In the United States, the President, as mercurial as he is, has almost complete control of the separation of powers which de Tocqueville talked about. He has a Supreme Court which is compliant, Republican majorities in both houses, and he uses Executive orders on a whim. That is a written constitution, which was meant to protect the liberties of the subject, so take care. We might see a change in a few months; we can only hope.
The transfer of power from elected parliamentarians to unelected judges has been happening under our current arrangements. It has happened as a result of the extension—by the judges, not by Parliament—of the scope of judicial review. Most of all, it has happened via the coming into force of the Human Rights Act—a transfer of power for which Parliament itself was, most unwisely, responsible. However, that transfer of power would be considerably extended by the adoption of a written constitution. In due course, it would inevitably lead to demands for political oversight of the appointment of judges, so candidates for judicial office could expect to be closely questioned on their political views. I do not think most people would welcome the importation to our shores of the practice whereby judges of the US Supreme Court decide on the date of their retirement by reference to the political make-up of those who would select their successor.
What mischief is this proposal designed to remedy? Our current arrangements have, by and large, served us well. With a few modest adjustments, returning to Parliament the power that has recently been transferred to the judiciary can, and will, serve us well in the future. A written constitution is something we do not need; it would do us harm and should not be introduced.
I have not seen any convincing explanation of how Parliament today could pass legislation that is entrenched in the sense that it can be repealed or amended, for example, only with a supermajority in Parliament or by a referendum, which are mechanisms adopted in constitutions around the world. Moreover, proposals for a written constitution generally require widespread political support, and I wonder what the prospects are, realistically, of the House of Commons approving legislation, if a mechanism could be found, that restricted its own freedom of action in the future and very likely transferred final decisions of great political moment to the judiciary.
As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said, there might be advantage in placing on a statutory footing some of the constitutional guardrails that currently could be swept away at the stroke of a prime ministerial pen. Sir Peter Riddell, Professor Robert Hazell and the UCL Constitution Unit have done invaluable work on that. Such a move would at least require a Government to confront what they were planning to do through legislation.
However, there is an aspect of our constitution which provides constraints and protections against extravagant executive action of the sort that the proponents of a written constitution fear. That is the existence of conventions, which operate to give the Executive freedom of action but are not immutable. They include the conventions that operate in this House, itself an important constitutional guardian, and that govern the relationship between the Crown, the Executive and Parliament. Conventions work when all who are subject to them respect their boundaries, but, if one player does not do so, the others can be expected to modify their responses. It is probably fruitless to hypothesise on the circumstances in which that might happen because they are unpredictable, but it should not be supposed that the current arrangements are toothless.
I return to where I started. There is little doubt that our unwritten constitution is vulnerable to bad actors, but so too are all constitutions. However, I am unpersuaded that a written constitution is the answer. Ours continues to work well and can adapt. A written constitution would be unlikely to solve whatever problems have been identified, and it is not likely to be feasible.
My feeling is that all noble Lords need to be sure to resist inroads into, in particular, the independence of the judiciary, which I have focused on, and the other aspects of the constitution which we all recognise; they should not necessarily go into a formal document.
The most egregious example was on 6 January 2021, when there was an assault on the Capitol building. The President’s false allegations of voter fraud and the pressure on the Vice-President, effectively, to overturn the result of the general election challenged the norm that, barring any legal challenge, the result of free and fair elections would be accepted and that thereafter there would be a peaceful transition from one Administration to another.
Under this President, we have seen the politicisation of federal prosecutions to go after perceived political enemies, the flagrant misuse of presidential powers of pardon, and threats to journalists and the freedom of the media. While federal judges would no doubt bristle at the suggestion that they allow political leanings and considerations to colour their judgments, it is perhaps remarkable that, in order to understand some of the judgments made, it is thought relevant to question who was the President who made the appointment. This gives rise to cynicism and undermines the authority of the courts. In April 2026 just 43% of Americans supported the work of the Supreme Court, down by 11 points from a year before.
These are serious matters, but I am not one of those who believes that America is about to slip into a further authoritarian abyss. However, I suggest that what is happening in the United States is both a warning and a wake-up call. In this country, we face challenges which should be now addressed. Respect for the opinions of others has declined. Public discourse in this country has become coarser, more divided and more challenging. The debate over Gaza and Palestine has at times descended into an ugly form of antisemitism. The language used to describe illegal migrants and asylum seekers is often degrading and dehumanising; every human is entitled to be treated with dignity. Threats to the safety and well-being of politicians and public figures have increased. These will only serve to push good people out of public life. Social media, of course, has played its part. We have also seen assaults on the independence of the judiciary, which were referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller.
These challenges to the unwritten parts of our constitution, particularly the values that bind us together, will, I fear, only increase. I have no great views on whether we should have a written constitution, but I rather suspect that the energy and time that would be involved in that process would be better expressed by addressing these fundamental issues.
I am a Methodist minister. Every year, I get a directory telling me about “who’s who” in my church, together with a second volume that is called The Constitutional Practice and Discipline of the Methodist Church—it is fat. It is the accumulation of all the bits and pieces over 250 years that have allowed us to feel this is our constitutional position—it is fixed. In my early years as a minister, when the manses we lived in were furnished, my wife and I had a bed which had one short leg on it. The Constitutional Practice and Discipline of the Methodist Churchfitted perfectly under the fourth leg, and we slept happily ever after. The trouble with that document is that when it was taken overseas to Methodist churches in Africa, Asia and all over the world, that constitution became a substitute for the gospel. The people coming to meetings would be armed with it, and they would say, “But on page 230, it says X and you are doing Y”. At the end of the day, written constitutions lend themselves to nitpicking, oppositionists and uselessness.
I have just half a minute left, so I will do my best. I preached a sermon at Gray’s Inn, the Mulligan Sermon, which was all about the judgment of a man called Richard Atkin, who took all those precedents that constitute our common law and made a kind of overarching statement for it. It boiled down, in the end, to a consideration of the Donoghue v Stevenson case—which all learned Lords know about—which, at the end of the day, allowed him to say that a duty of care and doing unto others what you would have them do unto you will undergird all our attempts, legally and constitutionally, to find the right way forward.
So, there you are. Let the lawyers get on with it now; I will be here to listen.
As to the core constitutional principles of parliamentary supremacy and privilege, they operate well if exercised with restraint and respect. But can we, in modern conditions, still feel quite the same complacency as Mr Podsnap in Our Mutual Friend, when he declared that
“We Englishmen are Very Proud of our Constitution, Sir. It Was Bestowed Upon Us By Providence. No Other Country is so Favoured as This Country”?
Mr Podsnap did not see beyond Hadrian’s Wall or foresee devolution. He gloried in English exceptionalism without acknowledging any possible advantages in written constitutions.
Today, we do not have to look abroad to see that our uncodified constitution has potential vulnerabilities. The supremacy of Parliament makes primary legislation immune to judicial review. Most written constitutions entrench fundamental individual rights, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has said, a model upon which UK Supreme Court Justices regularly adjudicate sitting in the Privy Council. The UK’s nearest equivalent, cleverly constructed to respect parliamentary supremacy, is the unentrenched Human Rights Act. But a Government commanding a parliamentary majority can simply repeal that at any time. With one exception, Parliament can do anything. The teasing exception already mentioned is that Parliament cannot bind itself. Nothing can be entrenched—although perhaps a way in the form of some sort of constitutional people’s convention, or even a referendum, would lead courts to recognise entrenchment.
The privileges of Parliament, combined with Article IX of the Bill of Rights, make the appropriateness of parliamentary procedures forbidden territory for UK courts. However, this does not mean that nothing needs doing to improve or change them. The problems are well known. The Institute for Government has described the Government’s iron grip over the Commons timetable as “unusual in international terms” and needing modification. The insufficiency of parliamentary scrutiny and the prevalence, breadth and vagueness of delegated legislation have been robustly criticised in and outside Parliament by very strongly worded reports, with one entitled Government byDiktat: A Call toReturn Power toParliamentand another entitled Democracy Denied?.
A written constitution would probably address Parliament’s supremacy, although, with respect to what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said about the Netherlands, there is a law going through there to give ex post facto jurisdictional power to strike down to the Raad van State on similar lines to the Conseil constitutionnel in France.
The Prime Minister co-authored Head North, as has been mentioned, looking with favour on the German Basic Law, which features scrutiny of both the supremacy and the internal procedural privileges of the German Parliament. The German constitution and its court were part of an essential new start, but both have won continuing acceptance as core elements of Germany’s legal and cultural identity. The court’s involvement with parliamentary procedures has been in the interests of democracy. It has prescribed general principles to prevent the misuse of majoritarian power: to ensure that Parliament is given sufficient time to debate proposed legislation; to ensure that minority parties have proper information and a proper say; to ensure the precision of legislation; and to avoid excessive or vague delegation of legislative powers to the Executive. At the same time, the German constitutional court has remained very sensitive to the greater democratic legitimacy of the German Parliament, and Germany is not governed by judges.
The elective dictatorship of this country clearly needs to improve itself in less dramatic ways than a written constitution. There should be a new self-denying concordat by the Executive, with the Government identifying and agreeing to observe certain basic principles governing Parliament and its procedures. The German model is an interesting parallel and precedent. Such changes would revivify Parliament as the place where the nation’s concerns are debated and true political compromise occurs.