My Lords, I am particularly delighted that we are having this debate on the day that President Zelensky is in London meeting the Prime Minister, I think while we are having this discussion. That only highlights the importance of agreements such as this.
We are going to scrutinise the UK-Poland Security and Defence Partnership and our International Agreements Committee’s report on that agreement. The agreement was signed in May 2026. The then Prime Minister described it—this is an important statement—as
“the biggest step forward in our defence and security relationship with Poland in a generation”.
It establishes a framework for co-operation between the UK and Poland across foreign policy, defence and security, and a whole range of other areas. The scrutiny period under CRaG expired on 9 September. We reported the agreement to the House for special attention and debate in the light of its political significance, but, in the light of our overall conclusions, we did not think it was necessary for this debate to take place during the CRaG period.
I thank the Government for their decision to publish the treaty online ahead of its formal laying in Parliament, which gave us more time to take evidence and therefore produce this more comprehensive report. I would be very grateful if the Minister could feed back to his colleagues that that practice is extremely welcome, particularly for treaties such as this. It gives us more time and does not necessitate asking for an extension to the CRaG process. The outcome is eminently satisfactory.
I thank the witnesses, who were numerous, especially and including the Minister for Europe and senior officials from the FCDO and the MoD. I thank the staff who support our committee, admirably led by Dom Walsh, in particular Priscilla Tomaz for her support in leading our inquiry and, effectively, producing the report.
My Lords, the security agreement between the UK and Poland, which we are debating and which has been so ably introduced by our chair, the noble Lord, Lord Johnson, has been firmly supported by your Lordships’ International Agreements Committee, of which I have the honour to be a member. I hope that this support will receive backing in this debate, enabling the agreement to go forward for early ratification.
The agreement is an ancillary one, in the sense that both parties to it are firm members of the Atlantic alliance and committed by Article 5 of the NATO treaty to come to the collective defence of its members if one or several of them are attacked. From all the evidence we took on this agreement, there was no suggestion that the Article 5 commitment is undermined or contradicted, or that there risks being confusion of responsibility as a result of it.
What is lacking in the agreement, however, is any real degree of specificity—the chair of our committee made that point several times during his speech. There was no specificity about how the parties to it will put flesh on the bones of their broad commitments. That remains to be defined and to be effected. That it should be so in a meaningful and operationally convincing way is essential if the agreement is not to remain just words on paper. I would be grateful if the Minister, in replying to this debate, could give an assurance that this follow-up is already in hand and under way.
Yesterday, the Warsaw Security Forum met. The Foreign Secretary was present at it and presumably had a good deal to say on matters that were relevant to this agreement—as others there would have, such as the Norwegian Foreign Minister, the German Foreign Minister and, of course, the Polish Foreign Minister. I would be grateful if the Minister could give us some sense of how that meeting went and where it took matters to.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, ended by correctly explaining that, although some reports of Select Committees can be very long and important, the shorter ones can also be essential. The way he described our relationship with Poland, and the history behind it, makes it very clear indeed why we felt so strongly about the importance of being able to carry this treaty forward. My noble friend Lord Johnson of Lainston, the chair, can take complex issues and make them seem simple but important, and I am grateful to him for his speech today. I also thank the clerk of our Select Committee—he may be sitting here in the Grand Committee, but we are allowed to say whether he is—and his team for the extremely good work they do for us and for their enduring patience with us.
Our report makes it clear that we welcome the treaty as a recognition of Poland’s crucial role in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, against a background of increasing security threats and in the light of a return of warfare to the European continent and of Russian aggression. I am of a generation that grew up thinking that could never happen again, but it has. As my noble friend Lord Johnson pointed out, our report concludes that the treaty is, however, basically high level and general in nature on a range of issues. The treaty lacks substance and detail to support its provisions.
I shall focus on two aspects of the treaty: hybrid threats and the importance of NATO. A significant part of the treaty relates to joint efforts to counter hybrid threats. Poland has faced repeated challenges caused by such attacks. Just last month, Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister, Krzysztof Gawkowski, was quoted by the BBC as saying that the fire at a Starlink station in the Masovian Voivodeship, which, of course, includes Warsaw, was
“deliberately designed to disable the station … disrupting internet access for various institutions, including the Ukrainian army”.
It is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay. I too add my thanks to those of others to our excellent staff, committee officials and the chairman, who led our deliberations on this and other matters with intelligence, impartiality and a great deal of humour. This helped to bring very serious matters to a very amicable conclusion.
As noble Lords have heard, this treaty prompted a number of questions during our deliberations. As the Minister knows by now, some are as yet unresolved. I refer to two in particular; they have been mentioned but I hope to bring something else to them.
First, the treaty seeks to do too much. It commits not merely to security and defence but to other, arguably more distant, aims. Some of them, such as economic resilience, are uncontentious; the noble Lord, Lord Johnson, referred to the potential collaboration on weapons systems, and we hope also for collaborations on platforms, which can only be a good thing. Others are a little more contentious, such as energy and climate security. Indeed, the treaty was described during our sessions as something of a Christmas tree—one on which the Government have agreed to hang a number of attractive decorations—and this phrase recurred a few times. We may wonder whether, in thus signalling their flagship priorities, the Government have the means, ability, will and resources to fund and provide them? In seeking to do so much—perhaps too much—the treaty may end up doing too little. Without adequate funding, a treaty such as this could seem like a hollow gesture.
What cannot be ignored—this has been mentioned by other noble Lords not only here but in the Chamber—is the fact that, so often, the UK’s security is in a perilous position, with its Army and naval resources being so depleted. As the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, warned only last year in respect of the UK potentially leading a peacekeeping mission in Ukraine, the UK’s resources are “so run down” that it could not lead any future peacekeeping mission in Ukraine as 40,000 UK troops would be needed for such a mission. He said:
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Committee for allowing me to speak in the gap, and particularly grateful to my noble kinsman Lord Johnson of Lainston for alerting me to the fact that this Committee was happening at all, because I must admit that I had not actually picked that up.
I have briefly read the report. I am not sure that from the brief look that I have had of it that I am missing very much, but I would like to speak about Poland and NATO. I am very grateful to be here with my noble friend—I describe him as my noble friend—the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Swansea. We were on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly together; he survived after the election, and I got slung off because the Conservatives had done so badly in the election.
I take noble Lords back to the Joint Expeditionary Force, which my noble friend Lady Lawlor referred to. The Joint Expeditionary Force was set up in 2012 at the NATO meeting that happened in south Wales at that time. It was made up of the Baltic states, the Scandinavians—Norway and Denmark—and Holland, and it was led by the British. The idea at that stage was that it was going to be a sort of training organisation, but it was the start, in my view, of the coalition of the willing. The interesting thing about the Joint Expeditionary Force is that it was joined in 2014 by two neutral countries: Finland and Sweden. They had not joined NATO at that stage. I put that thought into noble Lords’ minds.
If we think about the Joint Expeditionary Force as being a subsection of NATO but agreed and approved by NATO, and if independent neutral states can join it, why should we not set up something similar and have Ukraine become a member of it? I always had to say to my Ukrainian friends on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, whom we often used to see there, “Your chances of joining NATO are as near to nil as to make no difference”. They thought that it was essential that they join and get the guarantees of NATO, but the fact was that one blackball excludes, and too many NATO members were going to blackball Ukraine joining. I thought to myself, “Why shouldn’t they join the Joint Expeditionary Force or something similar?”
If I may intervene, I pay tribute to my friend, the noble Lord, for his long-standing commitment to Poland’s membership of the JEF. My recollection is that a member of the embassy said that Poland was well disposed to such a membership. Perhaps my noble friend the Minister could confirm that that is the case and that our Government are supportive.
I am very glad to hear the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, mention that, but I had no success whatever in persuading the Poles to join the Joint Expeditionary Force. Perhaps their position has now changed; I would like to hear the Minister’s views on that.
My Lords, those contributions anticipated a couple of things that I was going to mention. I start by thanking the committee for looking at this agreement and the noble Lord, Lord Johnson, for bringing this debate and his extremely helpful and clear explanation of the committee’s position. It is important that we recognise that British-Polish relations are important and, if we are to have an agreement, it needs to be meaningful, not just declarations of good will.
The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and others touched on the fact that the history of British relations with Poland over the past 100 years has rather ebbed and flowed. We recognised Polish independence in 1919 and, after we let down Czechoslovakia, we signed an agreement with Poland, a military defence pact, which ultimately took us into the Second World War when Hitler invaded it. But then, at the end of the war, we betrayed it, in effect, and handed it over to the Soviet Union. For that reason, many people in Poland came to this country. We have about 750,000 Poles living in the UK, partly because of that history. They certainly never want to go back to living under the totalitarian, brutal regime of the Soviets or any subsequent similarity, so of course they want strong defence and strong defence partners.
I remember, and I am sure others will too, the continuous demonstration by Solidarity outside the Polish embassy in Portland Place. Many of us at the time spoke proudly and bravely in support of Polish democracy and freedom, thinking it was never going to come. But it happened, and they are free and democratic; long may it continue. Indeed, that is partly what this agreement is surely about.
The consequence of that is that Poland is a remarkable country because it is right in the pivot of Europe—it gets trampled over, marched across and torn apart, and yet, historically, what an incredibly civilized, brave people they are. Maybe it is the history that has made them that way. Let us look at what has happened to Poland in the last 20 years. Its current GDP is $1.13 trillion. It is sustaining an annual growth rate of 3.5%; the UK would die for that. It does have a government debt of 65%, but again, look at ours. It has a deficit of 7%, perhaps that is the weakest part. But its GDP per capita growth, which was 36% of the UK’s in 1995 is now 81% of the UK’s and is expected to overtake ours within the next five years. On top of that, because it is where it is, it has a defence spending budget of 4.8%—substantially more than the United States, never mind anybody else—so it means business. It knows what the threats are, and it is organising for them—so I do not think the Poles will be interested in this agreement if we are not committed to it as well; that is what it will be looking for.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Johnson of Lainston for introducing the debate and the members of the committee for their work on this fine report. The committee is right to welcome closer co-operation between the United Kingdom and Poland, which has a crucial role to play in European security and is a key NATO ally. In our increasingly dangerous world, our alliances with our NATO allies and other international partners are essential.
Against that backdrop, which my noble friend mentioned, I welcome the visit of President Zelensky to No. 10 today. It was accompanied by news of the Government’s ongoing package of £1.6 billion to deliver more than 5,000 lightweight multirole missiles to Ukraine; that is very welcome news in the context of the United States’s decision to make an agreement with Vladimir Putin’s Government on diesel exports. Can the Minister confirm by what date the Government intend to complete the delivery of that package of support for Ukraine?
I turn back to the agreement with Poland, which represents the strength of the United Kingdom’s relationship with Poland across security threats, defence —in particular, enhancing military interoperability —economic resilience and energy systems. We welcome the strengthening of that relationship but, as noble Lords have said in the debate, we need much more clarity on the tangible benefits that will flow from this agreement. As the committee concluded, the treaty
“lacks substance and detail to support its provisions”.
Its commitments are, as was mentioned by my noble friend Lord Johnson and other noble Lords, high-level and general in nature. That is a thoughtful challenge to the Government; I hope that the Minister will be able to answer the criticisms in detail when he responds.
As my noble friends Lady Anelay and Lady Lawlor said, the committee has also rightly challenged the effect of Article 2(5), including whether it creates any commitments in addition to those under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response on that.
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I think we can all agree that the UK and Poland are entering into this treaty at a time of sustained geopolitical challenge, in particular Russia’s war in Ukraine and the growth of hybrid threats. In this context, we agree with the Government that Poland is clearly a vital partner and ally on NATO’s eastern flank. As the treaty recognises, Poland plays an increasingly central role in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and in shaping European responses to Russian aggression.
Committee Members will be aware that this is not the first defence treaty that the UK and Poland have signed. It aims to build on a previous defence treaty from 2017 and a non-binding declaration signed in 2023. However, compared with its predecessors, this treaty takes a far more expansive approach to the issues that are considered relevant to defence and security, including economic resilience, energy and climate security, and tackling illegal migration.
This expansive approach reflects the increasingly diverse threats that the UK and Poland face. However, the committee was concerned that it would cause challenges in co-ordinating collaboration across departments. I am not saying this as a political point, but I think that getting departments to work together is often a challenge even within His Majesty’s Government. To multiply that by the cubic number of two to add a second country’s government departments to collaborate will represent a significant challenge. I would be very grateful for the Minister’s comments on that, in the sense of the steps the Government will take to ensure that we truly have an integrated approach to implementing this treaty.
In the current security context, the treaty strengthens our bilateral defence relationship with Poland and affirms the importance of co-operation at this time of great uncertainty. By expanding the scope of co-operation beyond traditional defence policy issues, it establishes a comprehensive framework to address the increasingly integrated nature of the threats that face both the UK and Poland. These hybrid threats include provisions on collaboration in cyber security, critical infrastructure, supply chain resilience, and so on. This is particularly valuable for private defence companies, which are often the first targets of hybrid attacks.
I think the committee was pleased to note the element of industrial co-operation, where the treaty aims to make the UK and Poland joint European leaders in complex weapons manufacturing. As it happens, I spoke today to BAE Systems, which wanted me to express its support for this treaty because it pushed further the collaboration between BAE Systems and PGZ and enabled a far more institutional approach to combined weapons development and delivery. That is an important win for the UK defence industry and clearly a good thing for both countries.
The question that comes from this—this is the theme that the committee wishes to raise in scrutinising this treaty—is: can we be sure that the Ministry of Defence will dedicate the right level of resourcing to the teams behind these projects? If it does not do that, it will not succeed. For the benefit of other Members taking part in this debate, these processes are not simply about single weapons development—this is the important point. We want to see us move from single-platform development collaboration to overall defence collaborations, as we saw with BAE Systems in Norway. I am sure there will be some well-phrased words from the Minister on that, but we would quite like to hear some concrete responses to those points.
This leads on to the point that much of the treaty is very high level and general, rather than setting out detailed, substantive obligations. The Minister for Europe told us that this was deliberate and designed to allow for greater flexibility. Alongside this treaty is a list of 14 landmark projects, which we hope will turn the ambitions set out in the treaty into tangible outcomes. However, many of those also lack specific timelines and do not outline specific deliverables.
We are also concerned about how the treaty’s commitments will be funded. Frankly, someone may say that this is the elephant in the room, in the light of the UK’s defence spending plans and whether the UK’s broader commitments to NATO on defence spending will be met. The uncertainty around our defence spending plans undermines the UK’s reputation as an ally at a time of geopolitical uncertainty. Clearly, Poland will respond positively to this treaty from its point of view only if it feels that we are investing enough capital, time and resources into our entire defence industry, and then the specific treaty obligations that we have with it. I am sure the Minister cannot give me anything significantly specific about our defence spending plans, but it will be very important, since I am sure the Polish military will be listening to this debate—as, no doubt, are many other people as well—to underline truly our financial commitment to defence in general and to this project specifically.
I will move on to one of the other points that were raised by the committee in our inquiry. Article 2 of the treaty provides that the parties
“reaffirm their commitment to NATO as the foundation of their collective defence, and to their obligations … in the North Atlantic Treaty … in particular Article 5”.
It then states that in the event of an armed attack against the other party, the parties
“shall assist one another, including by military means in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty”.
We clearly welcome this reaffirmation of both parties’ commitment to NATO but we were a bit unclear as to whether the treaty adds commitments that go beyond our NATO commitments. The wording of Article 2 of the treaty, which states that assistance by “military means” is to be in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, appears to suggest that any use of military force in response to an armed attack would take place within the NATO framework. However, can the Minister clarify whether Article 2 creates any mutual defence commitments in addition to those under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty?
The EM notes that the devolved Administrations were consulted, but added that
“there are limited implications for the Devolved Administrations”.
I know, from having been in the Minister’s position, that that is understandable, given the complication of trying to get the approval of the devolved Administrations, particularly in a reserved matter such as the creation of treaties. However, this treaty specifically goes beyond simple military matters, and by its very nature, if it is to be effective, it covers whole areas of home affairs—immigration, crime, and so on. We really would like to understand from the Minister that the devolved Administrations have been properly consulted and that they are aware of their commitments that might relate to this treaty. All of them are important and I am sure they are all shared goals, but that has not been clearly enough indicated.
There was no reference to the treaty’s provisions for amendment or the scrutiny implications. We have repeatedly asked that the Government should say more in the Explanatory Memorandum on which amendments will be subject to ratification and, therefore, scrutiny. This is the third consecutive report—if the Minister could note this—in which we have had to make this point. It is very important that Parliament has the opportunity to scrutinise further amendments of these treaties. Many of them are designed to be flexible in the modern world, which we support, but we must ensure that we have effective oversight.
In conclusion, I believe personally, and I believe this is the strong view of the committee, that this treaty is to be welcomed. It enhances bilateral co-operation with a very important ally at what is clearly a highly challenging time and contains some important provisions, especially the principle of an expanded mandate between the two countries, important defence sharing and support for our industrial base. However, it is high level and general in nature. It remains to be seen how co-operation will be advanced in practice and, importantly, how it is to be paid for. It therefore remains to be seen what its true long-term significance will be. I look forward to the Minister’s comments, and I beg to move.
Another essential feature is that an agreement such as this has to enjoy wholehearted cross-party support. Without that, its implementation will always be at risk. Judging from this debate, that cross-party support would seem to be assured in this country. We were told in our sessions with witnesses that that would seem to be the case in Poland too. Does that correspond to the Government’s information? Perhaps the Minister could give us a word or two on that.
It is sometimes said that those who ignore or overlook history are fated to repeat it. Well, Anglo-Polish security co-operation is not an empty book. In 1939, this country gave Poland a firm guarantee of support in the event of an attack. We were then unable to validate that following the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the aggression against Poland and the Baltic states committed by Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union. The main price was paid by Poland and the millions of Poles who lost their lives. We have a tendency to forget that dismal failure on our part, overlaid as it is by the memories of ending the war that ensued on the winning side and without being occupied. The Poles were neither.
That memory should underlie the lively debate we are having here on our fulfilment of our commitments to NATO targets for defence spending. I do not intend to make a party-political point, because the sole purpose of agreements such as this is to deter effectively any potential enemy; it is not to wage a war but to deter anyone from having a war. We will not succeed in doing that if we obviously fall short of the targets that have been set by NATO and our own Government for defence spending.
The 1939 story is as much about failed deterrence as it is about the failure of mutual support when aggression was committed. Does that story hold any parallels now? Not exact ones, but Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its subsequent cyber and covert attacks must be a real concern to us all, and particularly to Poland, which is so much closer to the front line than us. I argue that there is much more to this debate than the words on paper in the report and the agreement before us today. I hope the Minister will address some of that when he replies.
He added that “many indications suggest” the attack fits into a
“new Russian doctrine of attack”.
Last year, I went to Warsaw to represent the European Affairs Committee at the EU’s inter-parliamentary conference on the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy. Our debate today gives me the opportunity to put on record, for the first time, my thanks to both Anna Clunes, who was then our excellent ambassador to Poland, and our military attaché for their private briefings about security threats and our co-operation with our Polish allies. I found their detailed briefing on hybrid attacks particularly illuminating, as it appears to forecast the future.
It is welcome that, accompanying the treaty, there is a list of 14 landmark projects to be delivered by the UK and Poland. They include plans to create a co-operation agreement to counter hybrid threats, which should support the efforts of the UK and Poland to disrupt malign actors, plus a new UK-Poland counter-hybrid working group to co-ordinate our joint working—that is essential. They also include commitments to work with our military and civilian arms to respond to cyber threats, of which we have seen several across Europe recently.
Such information sharing and joint responses could of course further strengthen the UK’s ability to detect cyber threats, hostile interference and attacks on critical infrastructure. However, the landmark projects are non-binding on the UK and Poland. They also lack specific timelines for delivery, as our chair said. Our committee was simply told by Minister Doughty, in a letter to us on 21 July this year, that
“the Landmark Projects are intended to turn that ambition into tangible activity and outcomes in the near term”.
Today, I invite the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Wood —who is responding to this debate—to give assurances that “near term” means putting the projects into effect as soon as the ratification procedures are completed. We should be ready, willing and able to do so.
I turn to references to NATO in the UK-Poland treaty. Article 2(4) provides that
“the Parties reaffirm their commitment to NATO as the foundation of their collective defence, and to their obligations … in the North Atlantic Treaty … in particular Article 5”,
to which the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, referred. However, when Minister Doughty gave evidence to our committee on 30 June, I found his presentation both somewhat confused and confusing. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, asked him the very important question as to whether the Minister did
“not feel any concern that by saying it complements and strengthens Article 5 of NATO, it casts some doubt on the validity of Article 5”.
Minister Doughty’s answer to the noble Lord seemed to confirm—I emphasise “seemed”—that the Government were indeed adding commitments to the UK-Poland treaty that would go beyond Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. He was not clear in his evidence that any use of military force in response to an armed attack would take place within the NATO framework. Our report therefore asks the Government, as a matter of urgency, to clarify whether Article 2(5) of the UK-Poland treaty creates any commitment in addition to those under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify this important matter today.
Ultimately, the long-term success of the treaty depends on turning the framework into substantive action. That will depend on adequate funding, strong departmental co-operation, practical implementation and accountability. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
“We just haven’t got that number available”.
I put it to the Minister that he could perhaps seek reassurance from his colleagues in defence.
The second problematic aspect of the treaty is even more fundamental, to my mind. As has been mentioned: is it necessary? The noble Lord, Lord Johnson, referred to two agreements that have already been signed with Poland in the past decade; this one adds a third. The Government have made a political choice to have a new treaty, rather than beefing up an older one—perhaps the 2023 declaration—and enhancing its status. A choice has also been made to expand the scope to economic resilience, energy and climate security. Indeed, since 2024, the Government have reached a number of bilateral security agreements, understandings and partnerships. In doing so, have they debased the currency by pursuing their explicit policy aim of strengthening their links with European allies?
My concerns are these. The Explanatory Memorandum says:
“The Government is entering into this Treaty to strengthen the UK’s partnership with Poland … at a time of sustained geopolitical challenge”.
As we have heard, both parties are members of NATO and bound by Article 5, which says that, in the event of
“an armed attack against one or more of them”,
the parties are obliged to assist each other, whether they are attacked individually or collectively,
“in concert with the other Parties”.
I simply repeat: does Article 2(5) of this treaty add anything of significance to that? There is something of “me too” about that article; I would like to be assured that that is not the case.
That leads me to think that either this treaty accomplishes nothing here or our expectations may be raised by a bilateral commitment over and above the existing obligations to Poland as a NATO member under the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. If it is the latter, is there a danger of spreading UK general good will so widely that its resources are not devoted to the safety of ourselves, our islands and the people of this country?
No single area of government policy is more important than UK defence and security, and that of its people. Since the 2024 elections, we have seen a number of other Europe-focused bilateral security treaties, one with France and one with Germany, and an announcement of a UK security and defence partnership with the EU last year. Whether the UK-Poland one will amount to anything other than what was described in our sessions as high-level discussions without adequate focused funding remains to be seen.
Of course, the UK is not alone in pursuing such bilateral agreements but, on defence, I have two points to make. This seems to put the emphasis on the Europeanisation of defence, despite the reality that the UK is a trading nation and head of the Commonwealth, with global interests, global responsibilities and alliances and global reach. It also complicates arrangements for defence, bringing potential complications and consequences. Professor Mark Webber of the University of Birmingham, who is also senior non-resident fellow of the NATO Defence College in Rome points out:
“Bilateralism of this sort adds to the complexity of Europe’s defence provision. Three tiers are now evident—the multilateral (involving NATO and increasingly the EU), the regional (with initiatives such as the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force), and the bilateral. These trends add up to a Europeanisation of defence—even within NATO, where the United States is stepping back”.
My conclusion is that this treaty may suffer, and indeed does suffer, from a danger of overreach—of trying to achieve too many disparate aims, some unconnected with security. It is also superfluous in part, coinciding with existing NATO commitments. Is it pointing to the Europeanisation of defence, and is that in the best interests of the UK and its global reach?
To come back to Poland, it is an absolutely essential part of any coalition of the willing. The Minister was answering questions about the coalition of the willing earlier today. That is the future of NATO, in my view. We cannot have any agreement on Ukraine without giving it security guarantees. That will mean air power being deployed in Ukraine because you cannot patrol a border that big without air power, and it is essential that we involve the Poles in that. We must bear in mind that the Polish commitment to defence means that they will shortly have an army of 140,000. The British have trouble meeting a figure of 70,000 for our Army, so the Poles will have an army twice the size of ours. They are a critical component of any coalition of the willing in the future. This will be the future of European NATO. We will need to have American intelligence, but the chances of getting American involvement, with troops on the ground, will be very small. The future of NATO lies in what will be the coalition of the willing enforcing the peace agreement that will eventually come—
Poland’s military capacity is better than was suggested. I read a brief saying that by 2030 it intends to have 300,000 full-time troops and 200,000 reservists, plus other land forces and air forces. Yet, it is fair to say that there is a complementarity between the UK’s defence capacity, for all its shortcomings at the moment, and Poland’s. Poland is a front-line state and therefore its capacity is based on that. We are not a front-line state, so we put our focus on to sophisticated weapons systems, the nuclear deterrent and intelligence, which we are definitely good at and can share. There is a complementarity there which is recognised by the agreement.
Within all this, how can our Government demonstrate that they will turn this agreement into practical reality? My starting point is that the right thing to do would be to prioritise what is not necessarily the most ambitious but what can be delivered fastest. At this point, I was going to talk about the Joint Expeditionary Force. Canada is joining it, for heaven’s sake, and, as the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, said, Sweden and Finland joined it before they joined NATO. I would be interested to know whether the Minister is aware of what the mood towards that is in Poland, because it seems to be logical for Poland. I can understand it was not necessarily logical for Poland to be a founder member, because it was looking towards the Baltic and the Arctic, but frankly the Baltic gets pretty close to Poland—indeed, Poland is a part of the Baltic. It would make sense as an outsider for it to be part of it. It would be interesting to know whether it feels it should be.
We already, as I understand, have a rotating small number of troops in Poland, 100 or so, and, of course, we have 1,200 troops in Estonia. I have recently visited the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn. This year I have been to Lithuania, and seen what is happening on the border with Belarus and what the Belarusians, and indeed the Russians, are doing to the Baltic states and Finland. It was shocking to me, because it had not been brought home to me, that the Russians and Belarusians are advertising in central and southern Asia for people to come to Russia and Belarus, offering them livelihoods, visas and jobs—but when they arrive, they are immediately rounded up, driven to the border, and forced across into the EU in order to provide this destabilising impact. I saw a video of this happening, taken from the border post on the Lithuanian side, showing a van arriving, lots of people getting out, then another van arriving and a lot of armed people getting out and forcing them at gunpoint to climb over the border fence—at night, of course. This is what we are up against, and they know that.
I happened to be at a meeting last night with Edward Lucas who writes a lot about this in the Times. He felt that one of the things the UK could do perhaps more dramatically than any others is to beef up the Joint Expeditionary Force, and make it a significant part of our defence ambition and capability. It is already there. I am not sure that beefing it up would be prohibitively expensive, but it would be a demonstration of serious intent.
Finally, when looking at the article, that is one suggestion that would make sense. By that, I mean maybe put more troops in more places—not a huge number more but enough to make a commitment, a difference and deliver. Article 1 makes some reference to support for international development. Given that we have demolished our international development capacity, I should be interested to know from the Minister what the Government have in mind on that.
Obviously, co-operation on counterterrorism crime makes absolute sense; it mells civil and military activity. Again, one of the things that we have disengaged from at our peril is Europol. I hope that, in November, we might start discussions on re-engaging in that. We were told that we would lose a lot because of that and my understanding is that we have actually lost a lot. That would be a logical framework for that kind of co-operation.
Science and technology co-operation is partly about defence but also partly about intelligence, AI and general industrial capacity. Poland is proving itself to be a country of real dynamic potential and a partner with which we should be positively wanting to engage. I said in my earlier remark that we should not patronise Poland but respect it for what it is, has achieved and can contribute, and for how it can respond in like mind.
I am left with two things only or perhaps two and a bit. One is the reference to energy co-operation, which someone said was controversial. I am going to be controversial, because I find it slightly concerning that we are discussing Russian oil and gas, and why we are not going to produce British oil and gas from our existing reserves. In the present climate, that makes no sense to me whatever. If we were to produce from Rosebank, for example, that would be oil that Russia would not have to export because we could export it to our European partners. It would also generate tax revenue, growth and jobs. As far as I am concerned, it is just ideology that is stopping us and it would be helpful if we were pragmatic about that.
The other point was mention of the devolved Administrations. Can the Minister clarify that issue, because there is talk about another Bill about security? That would require clarification on what is UK-wide executive decision-making, albeit with consultation, and what is left to the devolved Administrations. We cannot, in a crucial situation, afford confusion as to who is responsible.
My final point is that, if this treaty is to deliver in meaningful ways, as I said at the beginning of my remarks, will it require some modest secretariat to implement and develop it, and make sure that it is a live creature—not just a piece of paper that we have all signed, then gone away and done other things? I am absolutely certain that the committee is right: the cross-party support is real but there is a general desire for the Government to make it mean something and recognise that Poland will not respond if we do not have an offer that is worth responding to.
That issue of additional commitments brings me on to the most important issue underpinning all our international agreements on defence: namely, defence spending. We all remember the then Defence Secretary, now the Chancellor of the Exchequer, resigning earlier this year in protest at the previous Prime Minister’s failure to commit to defence spending of 3% of GDP by 2030. So it is surprising that we have not seen more progress. The Official Opposition have consistently offered our support to the Government on defence spending because we know that any Government’s first duty is the defence of the realm. Ministers now talk about 3.5% by 2035 but a clear road map of incremental increases over time is urgently needed to give our Armed Forces and, crucially, our allies confidence that we will hit our targets.
The Secretary-General of NATO, Mark Rutte, has openly called for a credible path to increased defence spending, but the Prime Minister has said that we will have to wait until the spending review—possibly as late as next autumn—for confirmation of the date by which the United Kingdom will hit the interim 3% spending target. Let us not forget that, as was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, Poland is currently spending more than 4.5% of its GDP on defence. Our allies are watching, and the Government must not leave them waiting any longer than necessary. Can the Minister say when we will see a proper road map for hitting our defence spending targets? If he cannot say that today, will he at least commit to making representations to the Chancellor on that point?
Beyond spending targets, clarity on how that money will be spent is also essential. The long-delayed defence investment plan is certainly a start, but can the Minister say whether the Government will publish an update on their defence spending plans when they finally set out their road map for hitting our defence spending targets?
I conclude by welcoming the Government’s continued commitment to working with our international allies in the face of growing global insecurity. I look forward to future engagement with the Minister as he continues his work towards that goal.