81: Clause 13, page 14, line 28, after “office” insert “with the intent”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes an ambiguity in Clause 13 and clarifies, as recommended by the Law Commission, that the offence can be committed even where no benefit is obtained or detriment is suffered, so long as there is an intention that this should be the case.
81: Clause 13, page 14, line 28, after “office” insert “with the intent”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment removes an ambiguity in Clause 13 and clarifies, as recommended by the Law Commission, that the offence can be committed even where no benefit is obtained or detriment is suffered, so long as there is an intention that this should be the case.
My Lords, we move on to Part 3 of the Bill, and I rise to speak to the first four amendments in this group, which concern misconduct in public office. I am grateful to the Minister, once again, for discussing them with me, as he promised to do.
This Government are to be commended for accepting the recommendations of the Law Commission, in its report of 2020, that the common-law offence be abolished and replaced by the statutory offences in Clauses 13 and 14. The common-law offence is an ancient one, but fell largely into disuse during the 20th century. Attempts to use it again more recently—for example, against journalists and purported whistleblowers as part of Operation Elveden—have demonstrated its defects. As the Law Commission put it at paragraph 3.41 of its report:
“The unifying concern is that the offence fails to provide the certainty and clarity that the criminal law demands, and is therefore prone to error, misuse and abuse by law enforcement agencies”.
My amendments focus on Clause 13, which creates what the Law Commission described as
“an offence of corruption in public office”.
The offence is intended to catch acts performed by public office holders for a corrupt purpose, including financial gain and the facilitation of a sexual relationship. An offence will be committed only if the officeholder knows, or ought to know, that the use of their office for such a corrupt purpose is a seriously improper act—a question to be decided by the jury with regard to the matters listed in Clause 13(3). The recommendations of the Law Commission have been watered down in two crucial respects. The purpose of my amendments is to strengthen the offence in the Bill so that it regains the clarity, precision and efficacy that the Law Commission recommended that it needed.
My Lords, I have put my name to the four amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I support the points he made. Words really matter, and particularly when one is seeking to put a common-law offence into statute, as we are doing here, great care needs to be taken that one reproduces as closely as possible what this rather loosely worded common-law offence was talking about.
There can be no better guide to what we should be saying than the Law Commission itself, given its overall responsibilities for the general shape of the law, which we have to administer. We owe a debt of gratitude to it for the work it has done, in view of the importance of the issue. I hope that the Minister will pay careful attention to the words of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, with which I entirely agree.
My Lords, I entirely agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, have said and endorse the reasons they have given.
My Lords, I have a number of amendments in the group, and I begin with my Amendment 93. It is a modest amendment, but it addresses what I believe to be an important gap in the Bill. Its purpose is straightforward: to ensure that the new offences of seriously improper conduct and breaches of duty apply to paramedics responding to emergency calls, in the same way as they apply to other public officials.
My concerns about this issue go back many years to a case that came before the Court of Appeal, in which I appeared for the prosecution. The court was presided over by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, who I am sorry to see is not in his place. The issue was whether a paramedic responding to an emergency was a public officer for the purposes of the common-law offence of misconduct in public office. The court concluded that a paramedic did not come within that definition. As a consequence, the conviction could not be upheld. I do not criticise that decision; the court applied the common law as it was bound to do. However, this Bill abolishes the old common-law offence and replaces it with a statutory scheme. In doing so, Parliament has the opportunity to reconsider whether that outcome remains the right one. The deeply troubling facts of that case illustrate why it matters.
CCTV footage from the back of an ambulance showed a paramedic engaging in serious sexual misconduct towards a vulnerable female patient while transporting her to hospital. Because of evidential difficulties, the Crown Prosecution Service did not consider that it could prosecute under the Sexual Offences Act. I do not know anyone who thinks that that kind of behaviour is okay or that it should fall outside the criminal law altogether. The reason is obvious: when a paramedic responds to an emergency, members of the public are often at their most vulnerable. They may be injured, unconscious, frightened or otherwise incapable of protecting themselves. Just as significantly, they have no meaningful choice over who attends to them. That is what distinguishes a paramedic from any other healthcare professionals. A patient can change their GP, but when an ambulance arrives at the scene of a serious road accident, the patient cannot simply choose another paramedic; they must place their trust in whoever has arrived to help them. It is precisely because the public have no choice that the duty owed by a paramedic responding to an emergency is such a profound one, yet paramedics are not included within Schedule 4.
My Lords, I have tabled Amendments 91 and 144, also signed by my noble friend Lady Hamwee, in this group. I also signed Amendments 87, 90, 92 and 94, tabled by my noble friend Lord Marks, whom I will leave to speak to them; obviously, I support them.
Amendments 91 and 144 are simple and straightforward so I need not detain the Committee for long. They would close a loophole that exists in the Bill. It is not clear that someone who is no longer a public official under the definition of the Act, because of resignation or retirement, would also not be held accountable for an act that was perpetrated while they were a public official. If the Minister is to resist these amendments, will he confirm from the Dispatch Box that anyone formerly covered as a public official under the Bill who had resigned or retired from that post could still be prosecuted for an offence under Chapter 3, “Misleading the public”?
While on the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, I also support her Amendment 93 to include paramedics within the category of public office holders. Her points were all persuasive, but I endorse, along with others, I believe, her argument that when we replace an outdated common-law offence that is generally thought to be no longer appropriate or to meet the requirements of justice, we should make sure that the new law is clear and comprehensive and that anomalies and omissions are addressed. I suggest that the omission of paramedics from the list of public office holders is just the sort of anomaly and omission that it is incumbent upon us to eliminate.
My Lords, all the amendments to Clause 13 in this group tidy up, rationalise and clarify the important new misconduct in public office offence. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, explained, Amendments 81, 83 and 84 make it clear that it is the intent that matters and that it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that a benefit is obtained by the defendant or that anyone else has suffered a detriment. As the noble Lord also explained, that represents the conclusion of the Law Commission and is powerfully endorsed by the briefing that we have received from Spotlight on Corruption, to which I am grateful. Amendments 83 and 84 are to the same effect.
Amendment 85 would replace the reasonable excuse defence with a public interest defence. Again, the Law Commission supported that and the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, has spoken to it. I say only this to the Minister. When he responded to the amendments proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, on Monday, which would substitute a public interest defence for the reasonable excuse defence in the Bill, in the offence of misleading the public, he said:
“While acting in the public interest could be the basis of a defence, we think that, for a new offence of this kind, covering as it does all statements made by Ministers and public officials on a wide range of matters, it is important to retain the breadth of a reasonable excuse defence”.—[Official Report, 19/10/26; col. 571.]
I have no wish to criticise the reasoning of the Minister or his brief, but I did not understand that answer as justifying a catch-all defence of reasonable excuse to an offence which has as its minimum ingredients both an intention to mislead the public—or recklessness as to whether the public will be misled—and knowledge on the part of the defendant that the defendant’s act is seriously improper. I repeat the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that, together, those requirements represent a high bar or a high threshold for guilt. We can argue, as we did on Monday, that the definition of “seriously improper” needs tidying up, but it seems to me, as it seemed to the Law Commission, that a public interest defence is much more appropriate than a reasonable excuse defence for this offence—as it was for the offence of misleading the public.
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Amendments 81, 83 and 84 address the fact that a Clause 13 offence is committed only if the person uses their office
“to obtain a benefit … or to cause another person to suffer a detriment”.
Interpreted with the caution appropriate to all criminal statutes, this appears to mean that the offence can be committed only if a benefit is actually obtained or a detriment actually suffered. That may not be what the Government intend.
During Commons Bill Committee last December, the Minister there stated that the offence can be committed where public office is used with the intent or—to use the Law Commission’s preferred word—purpose of obtaining a benefit or causing detriment; that would match the position under Section 2 of the Bribery Act 2010. I noticed that the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Lemos, used the same formulation when summarising Clause 13 in his response on Monday to Amendments 31 and 82, as in col. 479 of Hansard. However, this is not a case where an assurance from the Dispatch Box will suffice. Our courts, increasingly and not unreasonably, tend to focus on the words of the statute that we ask them to apply. It is hard enough to explain the law to juries, and harder still when the law is not clear on its face. My amendments would put beyond doubt the interpretation that the Government themselves appear to favour.
My other amendment, Amendment 85, seeks to narrow the defence provided for in Clause 13(5). The Law Commission recommended what it described at 5.104 of its report as
“a statutory ‘public interest’ defence—that would be available in certain, limited circumstances—most likely in the context of unauthorised use or disclosure of official information”.
It went on to explain, by reference to principle and precedent, why it was appropriate to impose the legal burden of establishing this defence on the defendant. This narrow whistleblower’s defence has been replaced in the Bill with a far broader defence of “reasonable excuse”. That could be rather significant in practice. It would open the way for defendants charged with seriously improper, corrupt conduct to avoid penalisation by relying on such matters as short staffing or lack of training—matters which are obviously not in the public interest, but which a jury might be persuaded constitute a reasonable excuse.
The impact assessment rightly makes the point that honest mistakes or finely balanced operational decisions should not be caught by this offence. However, the combined requirements of corrupt purpose and seriously improper behaviour present a high bar to conviction, in contrast to the position under Clause 12, some of the foibles of which we discussed on Monday. Therefore, the case for a narrower defence to Clause 13 is, if anything, stronger than the case for a narrower defence to Clause 12, which was so ably made in that debate by the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt. The noble Baroness’s Amendment 86 would place the legal burden of establishing this defence on the defendant, as recommended by the Law Commission on orthodox grounds in 5.112 to 5.122 of its report; I entirely support that amendment.
In Amendments 88 and 89, the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, also raises the issue of what, if any, defence is appropriate to the Clause 14 offence under “Breach of duty to prevent death or serious injury”. So far as I can see, the Law Commission did not see the need for any statutory defence to a charge under Clause 14. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s position on why a defence, particularly such a broad one, as provided by Clauses 14(2) and (3), is necessary. I beg to move.
The consequence is not merely theoretical. If behaviour of the sort I have described were to occur again, a prosecution under Clause 13 for serious improper conduct would still not be possible, nor is that the only difficulty. It also affects the new offence created by Clause 14, namely breaches of duty to prevent death or serious injury. If there is one category of professional whose daily work involves preventing death or serious injury, it is a paramedic responding to an emergency call. Let us suppose that a paramedic deliberately withheld appropriate treatment because of prejudice towards a patient on grounds of race. As matters presently stand, they could not be prosecuted.
As I understand it—again, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for meeting me to discuss this—the Government’s explanation for not including paramedics is that they were not covered by the old common-law offence, and therefore this has not been carried over into the new offences. With respect to my noble friend, that approach misses a valuable opportunity. The purpose of this legislation should not be simply to replicate what has happened under the old law. The whole reason for replacing the common-law offence is to create a modern framework of public accountability. The need for modernisation is the very reason that the common-law offence is being abolished, and we in Parliament are deciding who the law should hold accountable now and for the future.
If one were to ask an ordinary member of the public whether a paramedic responding to a 999 call exercises public power and occupies a position of public trust, I suspect that the answer would be unequivocal. When a uniformed paramedic enters a stranger’s home in the middle of the night, when a patient is unconscious, terrified or incapable of making decisions for themselves, when intimate physical contact has to take place because a medical emergency requires it, when the decisions taken may determine whether somebody lives or dies, it is difficult to imagine a clearer example of public trust being placed in an individual.
There is also a wider point about vulnerability. The Bill is not concerned simply with the exercise of authority but with the abuse of position. Few relationships involve a greater imbalance of power than that between an emergency responder and a patient in acute distress. A paramedic who arrives enjoys immediate and unquestioned trust. We expect that trust to be respected, and we expect accountability if it is abused. Of course, paramedics are subject to professional regulation, but professional discipline and criminal liability serve different purposes. Professional regulation is about fitness to practise. The criminal law is concerned with the protection of the public and society’s condemnation of serious wrongdoing. They are complementary; they are not alternatives.
Most paramedics perform an extraordinarily difficult role with skill, compassion and professionalism, and I pay tribute to them. This amendment is not directed at the many, it is directed at that rare bad apple whose conduct brings the profession into disrepute and places vulnerable members of the public at risk.
I therefore hope that before Report, the Government might be willing to look again at this issue. If, having done so, my noble friend remains unpersuaded, I would be grateful to hear more about the reasoning behind that position, but I hope there may yet be an opportunity to reach a common view that reflects both the realities of modern public service and the expectations of those whom those public servants exist to protect.
I turn very briefly to Amendments 86, 88 and 89 in my name and Amendment 85 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, to which I have added my name. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has said, they all concern the defences available to these new offences. I do not intend to repeat what I said on Monday. I suggest that there are strong arguments for the approach suggested by the Law Commission and that it would be neither unfair nor unusual to adopt them. I listened carefully to my noble friend the Minister’s response to what I said on a previous group, and I say very gently to him—for whom I have the greatest of respect—that in relation to Clauses 13 and 14, his answer cannot be the same, as these are not new offences. After all, they replace the common-law offence of misconduct in public office.
That is why the Government really ought to explain more fully why they have chosen to depart from the considered recommendations of the Law Commission. If the Government now propose a different course, Parliament is entitled to know why. It matters because the approach adopted by the Bill will make it more difficult to prosecute public officials who have behaved in a criminally bad way. Victims and survivors whose confidence in public institutions has too often already been shaken deserve a clear and convincing explanation for that change of approach. If the Government consider that a different approach is justified, it would be helpful to understand the basis of that conclusion but, if not, I hope the Government will reflect further and think again.
This is Committee on an important Bill on which the Law Commission has expressed a relatively strong view which is supported by the Minister’s immediate predecessor. I accept that he may find that a little unusual but, in the circumstances, it might be best for the Government simply to accept Amendment 85.
I also suggest, for the reasons given by the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, that it would be sensible to accept Amendment 86, which raises the hurdle for a defendant against whom the principal ingredients of the offence are proved and who wishes to raise a defence, whether of public interest, as we suggest, or of reasonable excuse, as per the unamended Bill. I contend that exactly the same reasoning applies to Amendments 88 and 89, relating to the Clause 14 offence of breach of duty to prevent death or serious injury, again for the reasons that the noble Baroness raised.