My Lords, these regulations revoke and re-enact, with expanded purposes and designations criteria, the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020.
This instrument was laid on 13 October, under powers in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. The measures in this instrument, subject to the made affirmative parliamentary procedure, entered into force on 15 October.
Since coming into office, the Foreign Secretary has been clear that we will be stronger in our values, bolder in our action and relentless in pursuing alliances with our partners across the world.
Sanctions are a powerful lever that we have to advance our foreign policy goals in the face of action that breaks the law and is unacceptable. When we impose sanctions, we do so to isolate those responsible, to restrict their ability to act and to change their behaviour. We do it to send a clear message, far beyond those we target, of the values that the UK will stand up for. We try to do it, where possible, alongside our partners to maximise the impact of the sanctions we impose.
The global human rights sanctions regime—now the global human rights and international humanitarian law sanctions regime—is particularly vital for this. Since the regime began in 2020, the UK has delivered over 180 designations, and under this Government we have used the global human rights sanctions regime to tackle issues such as forced labour in south-east Asian scam centres and extremist settlers violently attacking Palestinians in the West Bank, and to those responsible for the violent crackdown on protesters in Georgia.
At end to insert “but this House, while recognising the importance of effective targeted sanctions, regrets that the Regulations permit designation on suspicion of indirect involvement, benefit or association without clearly defining those terms; notes the absence of safeguards to protect lawful trade with Israel within its pre-1967 lines; and calls on His Majesty’s Government to (1) confirm that such trade will not be affected by these Regulations, (2) publish clear designation criteria and an evidence-based framework to ensure consistent global application, and (3) provide an impact assessment and annual report to Parliament on the operation of the regime”.
My Lords, in moving the regret amendment in my name, I declare my interests as set out in the register.
Sanctions, precisely targeted and founded on clear evidence, are a legitimate instrument of British foreign policy and have my support. But these regulations do not meet that test. They seem, to many, to be there to satisfy the local domestic political objectives of the Foreign Secretary and his Government.
This is a major change in British foreign policy, made without consultation, without an impact assessment and without a vote in either House. Parliament is being asked to approve powers already in use. That is not scrutiny; it is ratification. I move this amendment because I believe this policy is a mistake.
The Explanatory Note makes no reference to Israel, but the Foreign Secretary’s Statement in the other place makes it clear, as has the Minister, that his concern is about settler violence in the West Bank, or Judea and Samaria, and that is driving this legislation through. Let me be quite clear: I condemn such violence, by either side. Those who break the law should be arrested and punished. But I am disappointed that the Foreign Secretary made no mention whatever of the numerous attacks on Jewish people in that area. Violence by terrorists against any civilians must be condemned. The Government already have the tools to act: 38 people have been sanctioned for settler violence, and the Government’s relentless and unequal focus on measures against Israel has left many Jews in this country fearful.
I was graciously given a minute by the noble Lord, Lord Wood, but thank you.
There were 1,962 antisemitic incidents over the past six months in the UK. These regulations do nothing to reduce the tensions in the UK.
I conclude by asking the Minister five questions. Will he confirm that trade with Israel inside the green line will not lead to designation? Will he assure British banks that they will not be penalised for continuing to deal with Israel’s banks? Will the Government define the terms on which people can be sanctioned and report annually to Parliament on how this regime is used, country by country? Will the Government assess the impact, particularly on charities, before going further? Will the Government refrain from designations while Israel forms a new Government at this crucial time? I beg to move.
My Lords, I speak from the perspective of being a vice-president of the Liberal Democrat Friends of Israel, not as a spokesman of my group.
This is an even more unstable and unpredictable time in Middle East politics than usual. We have the aftermath of elections in both Israel and the US, with lots of speculation but not so much actual knowledge of what the next few weeks and months will hold. I hope for a Change Government in Israel—my party, the Liberal Democrats, is allied with Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid—but everything is up in the air there, as it is in Washington. The possibility of a US-led renewal of hostilities in the Iran war cannot be dismissed, regardless of the domestic Israeli situation, and could influence the coalition talks.
I ask the Minister what forethought is going into the application of these sanctions and their potential repercussions at this time. Let us recall, as the noble Lord, Lord Leigh of Hurley, did, all the things that happened within a day of September’s announcement: the closure of the British consulate-general in east Jerusalem and other consequences. Did the Government foresee that response by the Israeli Government, as they should have done? Does the Minister accept that the UK now has less influence over Israeli policy, events in Gaza and the future of Jerusalem than it did on 7 September, and that relations with the Palestinian Authority are made harder by a much reduced presence in east Jerusalem?
My Lords, yesterday evening, some of us had the privilege of gathering in the Robing Room, with the permission of His Majesty, to celebrate the life of our dear friend Meta, Baroness Ramsay. We miss her greatly. Having had the privilege of serving with her when she was the long-standing chair of Labour Friends of Israel in the House of Lords—I had a much briefer stint as chair in the Commons—I think I can say with confidence how dismayed she would be, not only by these sanctions targeting Israel in the way they do but by the turn this Government have taken since the new Foreign Secretary took his place, with the Minister supporting him.
The tributes reflected on how loyal and faithful Meta was to the Labour Party over many years—more faithful, I have to say, than I have been. I think she rebelled fewer than half a dozen times in her whole career in the Lords, so if this were brought to a vote, it is highly unlikely that she would have voted against the Government. However, I think the Minister knows from his time observing her on the parliamentary committee that she would have made her views known in a courteous but persuasive way. In her absence, I will finish with a number of extra questions.
The new aid-obstruction ground in the sanctions covers those who facilitate or finance the disbursal of aid. Will the Government use it against Hamas, which grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, and against those who finance and shelter it, including the IRGC and Hamas figures operating from Turkey? What safeguards will prevent the definitions “associated with” and “supported” being weaponised against Jewish charities, donors and trustees who wish to give lawfully to Israel? Finally, the Government said that these regulations will not affect freedom of religion. Have the Government assessed their impact on Jewish religious observance? Will the Minister confirm that worship, religious visits and support for synagogues and other religious institutions will not be treated as support for settlement activity?
My Lords, I declare my interests as set out in the register. I support my noble friend Lord Leigh and wish to focus on one issue: certainty. If these regulations are truly targeted, those affected should be able to understand where the boundary lies. Yet the Government have failed to provide that clarity. Faced with serious penalties, many will simply err on the side of caution. Can the Government state clearly whether buying a home in East Jerusalem, including near the Western Wall, or making a charitable donation would become grounds for designation? What legal test distinguishes a lawful transaction from sanctionable support? Will that test be published? Trustees, donors and charities should not have to guess whether lawful activity crosses an invisible line. If the Government have a clear test, they should publish it. If they do not, that is precisely the problem.
There are wider consequences. If charities and individuals cannot determine where the line is drawn, why should banks and businesses? Many will simply withdraw from dealings with Israel as the safest course. What assessment did the Government make of the impact on UK businesses with US operations in light of American anti-boycott laws? What assessment was made of any wider implications for the UK-US relationship? What guidance will be issued? If those assessments have been undertaken, they should be published. If guidance has been prepared, it should be issued.
My Lords, I supported the principle behind the global human rights sanctions when they were first introduced but, like many good things, this instrument carries a risk of mission creep. I fear that that is what we see in these new regulations.
I am concerned about the extension of the regime to three new grounds, in particular violations of international humanitarian law. I am also concerned about the new mechanism of designation by description, whereas until now we had been able to designate only by name. Both questions matter because the threshold is quite low. “Reasonable grounds to suspect” is not a demanding test, particularly when applied in the fog of war. I do not think that there has ever been a war in the history of warfare in which there were not reasonable grounds to suspect that the laws of war were being broken. If we want to apply consistently this threshold of reasonable grounds to suspect, we would be required to consider imposing sanctions in connection with every ongoing armed conflict, including those involving allies.
I wonder whether the Government have thought about the relationship between this instrument and the arms embargo regime, where the threshold is “clear risk” and is higher than “reasonable grounds to suspect”—particularly when we consider that individuals associated with someone may also be sanctionable under the new instrument. Does that mean that we could still potentially sell arms to individuals whom we have sanctioned? How do the two regimes operate together?
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The global human rights sanctions regime is of course not our only tool: we also make extensive use of our range of geographic sanctions regimes. For example, last week we announced the designation of 15 commanders, on both sides of the conflict in Sudan, who are suspected of perpetrating or inciting heinous atrocities against civilians, in particular conflict-related sexual violence. As we mark the anniversary of the horror we saw after the fall of El Fasher, these designations remind the perpetrators of atrocities that the international community is watching them, and that actions have consequences.
However, the action on Sudan was possible only because our Sudan sanctions regime permits designations on the grounds of violations of international humanitarian law. Before we laid this instrument, the Government did not have the flexibility to respond in this fashion to similar atrocities taking place in countries that did not happen to have their own geographical sanctions regime. As a result of this revision, now we do.
This instrument also expands our ability to stand up for our values and tackle injustice and suffering around the world in other ways. The expanded regime addresses a broader range of human rights abuses and violations by adding the right to security of liberty and person, and also gives the Government powers to respond with sanctions where aid has been deliberately prevented from reaching civilian populations.
I will now turn to each measure in this instrument in more detail. I want to be clear this is a strong enhancement of our existing powers. The global human rights sanctions regime gave us the ability to use sanctions where there were reasonable grounds to suspect serious violations or abuses of the right to life, the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the right to be free from slavery and not to be held in servitude or required to perform forced or compulsory labour. These amended regulations allow all pre-existing sanctions to remain in force but give us a powerful lever to respond to a broader range of situations.
The expanded sanctions regime now allows designations to be made where there are reasonable grounds to suspect serious violations of international humanitarian law. This strengthens the UK’s ability to respond to serious conduct that arises during armed conflict, such as the targeting or mistreatment of civilians, where international humanitarian law provides the most relevant legal framework.
As the Foreign Secretary set out to Parliament on 8 September when he committed to laying this instrument, it gives the UK the powers to target those constructing illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank, such as those participating in E1 settlement expansion.
As I have said, the previous version of the regime permitted designations where there were reasonable grounds to suspect serious violations of the right to life, the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and the right to be free from slavery and not to be held in servitude or required to perform forced or compulsory labour. This instrument now adds the right to liberty and security of person to that list of rights. This ensures that the regime can now better address issues such as arbitrary detention and related conduct.
The global human rights and international humanitarian law sanctions regime also adds a new ground of obstruction of the delivery or distribution of, or access to, humanitarian assistance. This addition reflects the serious humanitarian consequences that can result when aid is deliberately prevented from reaching civilian populations—an objective I am sure noble Lords will agree is important.
The amended regime also adds the power to designate by description. This allows the UK to designate where a specific name is not available and, in doing so, to capture all members of a specific group or organisation, allowing greater flexibility and reach under the regime.
I note that the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, has tabled an amendment of regret, and I look forward to hearing from him and responding to his concerns.
To conclude, this instrument provides the Government with vital new general powers with which to stand up for British values and respond to serious human rights abuses and serious violations of international humanitarian law around the globe. I beg to move.
The regulations came with three promises: that they would be targeted, that they would not touch Israel inside the green line, and that they would be global. Not one of them survives a reading of the text.
The first promise was that they would be targeted. But a person can be designated not for committing an abuse but for providing “support” for it, obtaining “any other benefit” from it, or being “associated with” someone involved. That is not a scalpel; that is a net, and the Government know it. They have said themselves that these powers
“widen the net … to anyone who facilitates, promotes, incites, or funds”
the conduct in question, including the banks that finance settlement growth. So, what does “associated with” mean? A relative? An accountant? A customer? When the penalty is seven years in prison, a British business is entitled to know where the line is drawn. It is a fundamental feature of the rule of law that the law, especially a law with criminal penalties, should be clear, so that everyone knows what they can and cannot do.
The second promise was on the green line. On 8 September, the Foreign Secretary told the other place that the Government would
“absolutely ensure that it does not hit green-line Israel”.—[Official Report, Commons, 8/9/26; col. 887.]
They would “absolutely ensure” that. So, where is it? These regulations contain no safeguard for trade inside the green line, and no definition of where that line runs.
And what of Jerusalem? Two weeks ago, I was in east Jerusalem, as the UK chairman of the Jerusalem Foundation, for the opening of the Beit Hanina sports complex. It is the first ever swimming pool in east Jerusalem. It was paid for in part by the city, and in no small part by international Jewish donors, and it will be handed as a gift to the local community to run. It has been so successful that we would like to build a second swimming pool in east Jerusalem, to match the many in west Jerusalem. But donors have now told us they are not prepared to consider such a proposal, because they may be caught under this legislation. Can the Minister assure British charities that their work will not be caught by this instrument, when their trustees face the real possibility of criminal penalties?
The Government treat east Jerusalem, including the Western Wall, Judaism’s holiest site, as occupied territory, so I ask the Minister: is the Western Wall within the scope of this regime—yes or no? Could a British citizen who buys a flat in the Jewish quarter of the old city from a Jewish seller be at risk when, if they made the same purchase from an Arab seller, they would not be? The Government, and every party to negotiations, have always said that the status of Jerusalem must be settled in negotiations, not in regulations.
The real cost is trade between Britain and Israel, which is worth some £5.9 billion a year, and at the heart of it sit Israel’s major banks. Those banks lend across the country because Israeli law forbids them from refusing customers due to where they live. Under these regulations, a mortgage in a settlement could be “support”, the interest on it a “benefit” and, on suspicion alone, the bank could be designated.
Anyone who has worked in the City knows how compliance departments work. They will face undefined tests and a seven-year criminal sentence. They will not ask, “Is it lawful?”; they will ask, “Is it worth the risk?”, and they will say no. That is how a boycott of Israel begins: not by decree but by deterrence. The Government say they oppose the BDS campaign, yet they have written its sharpest element into British law.
So who pays? I am afraid that we in the UK pay. British banks pay and firms with US operations pay: US federal law treats measures against any territory controlled by Israel as a boycott, so compliance with these regulations would expose them to US penalties. The NHS pays. One in seven generic medicine packs prescribed here comes from an Israeli company, Teva. British business pays: firms with American operations now risk anti-boycott penalties. Palestinians pay: some 30,000 depend on jobs with settlement-linked employers. This smacks of collective punishment. I ask the Minister: will the Treasury issue general licences to protect the NHS’s medicine supply?
The third promise was that this regime is global. Take Northern Cyprus. Turkey has occupied the north of Cyprus since 1974. The UN Security Council has ruled the self-declared republic as legally invalid, and this country is one of Cyprus’s three guarantor powers. How many designations have the Government made? None. How many restrictions on trade? None. One rule for Turkey, one rule for Israel.
Then there is Xinjiang. Its settler corporation has been sanctioned in full by the US since 2020. Here, goods from the region enter without restriction. Then there is Hamas’s and the Iran-backed Houthis’ hostage-taking, diversion of aid and detention of UN staff, yet Ministers have given no indication that these powers will be used against them. That is not a global regime; it is a regime with a global title and a single target.
The cost is not hypothetical. Within a day of the announcement, Israel ordered the closure of our consulate in Jerusalem, expelled British personnel from the centre co-ordinating—
Looking at the situation now, and the question from the noble Lord, Lord Leigh, about designations during coalition talks, will the Government undertake not to issue designations while a new Israeli Government are being formed? The Foreign Secretary said in the House on 8 September 8 that
“our argument is not with the people of Israel … our argument is with the conduct of its Government”,—[Official Report, Commons, 8/9/26; col. 880.]
so should the UK Government not prioritise getting a change in the conduct of a new Israeli Government, away from the destructive policies of the Netanyahu Government? What assessment will the UK Government make, before any designation, of the impact not only on those coalition talks but on relations with whatever Government emerge?
The opposition Change parties have said that they will, thankfully, crack down on the horrendous settler violence in the West Bank, show more flexibility in moving forward with a post-war plan for Gaza and mend fences with Israel’s allies, so do the Government really think now is a good time to apply these sanctions, about which there are many questions? Will the Minister confirm that any designation will be preceded by a formal assessment of its diplomatic consequences, including in the light of emerging US policy? Finally, will the Government confirm that the decision will be taken by Ministers, not officials alone, given the political and diplomatic minefield that is before them?
The House is not being asked this afternoon whether certainty is desirable. It is being asked to approve regulations whose boundaries remain undefined in practice. Where sanctions carry serious penalties, uncertainty is not a technical flaw; it is a fundamental defect. If those affected cannot know with confidence where the line is drawn, the House should be concerned about what it is being asked to approve. Whether it was intended or not, this is in effect BDS by the backdoor. That is why I support the regret amendment.
I have further questions for the Minister. Will the Government publish examples that show what “reasonable grounds to suspect” specifically means in evidential terms in the context of an armed conflict? What independent assessment will the Government make of evidence from the UN, NGOs, media or foreign Governments, particularly where an allegation is repeated in report after report despite often being based on the same second-hand source?
Most importantly, how will the Government ensure that these new grounds and mechanisms are generally applied consistently? If the Government impose sanctions in connection with a settlement in the West Bank, will they set out the legal reasons for not doing the same in other occupied territories such as Western Sahara and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus?