That the Grand Committee takes note of the Report from the Economic Affairs Committee Fortifying the fiscal framework (4th Report, HL Paper 291, Session 2024–26).
This is the second occasion since being appointed chair of your Lordships’ Economic Affairs Committee that I appear before you as something of an imposter. The report that we are debating today was prepared under the guidance of my predecessor, my noble friend Lord Wood of Anfield. Having done his bit in this role to save Britain from bankruptcy, he is now more than doing his bit in the Foreign Office under Ed Miliband, so we wish him well.
It is also my pleasant duty to thank the officials who contributed so much to the report before your Lordships today—most of all, the staff of the Committee, Dervish Mertcan, James Parkin, Neil Mellor and our clerk, Matthew Manning, whose balanced judgments shine through its pages. I also thank those who served on the committee when we took most of the evidence for this report and have been rotated off since. A particularly brutal eight members were removed at the new year. I thank those members who have turned up to this debate—and I thank the three current members of the committee, the noble Lords, Lord Burns and Lord Razzall, and the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf, for participating in it today.
In preparing this report, we had the benefit of advice from two former Permanent Secretaries to the Treasury, the noble Lords, Lord Burns and Lord Turnbull. I am glad to see that the noble Lord, Lord Macpherson, is speaking today as well. Outsiders criticise the House of Lords, but what other institution in British life could boast that advice on its deliberations?
Fiscal policy is at the heart of our politics. Two key facts about it despite stand out and are rarely remarked upon. First, the OBR, the Office for Budget Responsibility, last July projected that if one simply rolled forward present trends, debt as a share of GDP would be about 270% by the early 2070s. Needless to say, witnesses in our inquiry were clear that that debt level could never in practice be achieved because the markets would stop lending to the Government well before that level was reached. The bond markets would have done their much-maligned job, especially as in Britain’s case—unlike, say, with Italy or Japan—as I think Mark Carney once said, we depend on the kindness of foreigners to fund our borrowing.
My Lords, I welcome this very perceptive and timely report, and I congratulate all those who prepared it.
I agree that the current fiscal rules system set up by the previous Conservative Government, and extended and modified by this Government, cannot possibly achieve its main aim, which should be to control debt better. Whether there is a five-year target or a three-year target does not really make much difference. Some people thought that that was a welcoming tightening, but the underlying truth is that year 3 or year 5 never comes and there is no pressure on the Government to make sure that they meet it. By the time they get to that year, it is no longer year 3, so it no longer has a biting target. That is clearly absurd.
I also agree with the committee saying that the OBR’s role has to be that of an independent forecaster and that the Government should be able to talk to it but should not be bound by it. Obviously, a good Government would wish to explain why they disagreed, or should explain how they intend to handle debt and deficit if they do not like the figures that are being produced.
In 2010, when this family of targets first started after the banking crash and the explosion of debt and expenditure over the period of that crash, public spending—that is, total managed expenditure—was £760 billion. This year, according to the latest forecast, it will be £1,449 billion. That is an increase of 90% over the years. I cannot remember a year, until we got to a Labour Government, when I was not told that we were cutting public spending, but spending is up 90% in cash terms. The inflation check from the Bank of England says that there was 62% inflation over that period, so there was a fairly substantial real increase, which occurred in most years. Some individual programmes were cut, and some priorities could not be pursued, but it is difficult to see that we have had a rigorous set of controls over either spending or borrowing.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, for his introductory remarks to, again, a report to which I do not think he contributed when we wrote it. As he mentioned, I was a member of the committee during the investigation. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wood of Anfield, for chairing the committee during that period, and I wish him well in his new tasks. It is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Redwood; I agree with much of what he has said today.
I want to discuss, first, the OBR’s role in budget-making, and, secondly, whether the fiscal rules are really helping. The OBR has recently been getting a tough press from some corners about its role. I regret this; I must declare an interest as a past chair of the oversight committee of the OBR. Releasing the forecast early last year was clearly an embarrassing mistake. Anyone who has been involved in forecasting knows that all forecasting is difficult, particularly when we have a background, as we have had, of unexpected military conflicts. However, the OBR basically does what it is asked to do in the legislation that set it up. At Budget time, it produces forecasts, offers an independent view of the impact of various Budget measures and provides an opinion on whether the Government will meet their own rules. Separate from the Budget, it also gives its opinion on whether the long-term fiscal outlook is sustainable on present policies, which has already been mentioned.
There is nothing to stop the Government producing their own forecasts in parallel. They can dispute the longer-term effects of policy measures. They can also change the fiscal rules, as we have often seen them do in the past. The suggestion that the OBR somehow dominates the construction of the Budget is simply not correct: it is the Government who set the rules and procedures. For me, the OBR’s value has been its real contribution to impartiality and transparency. It has published much more analytical information than before; it has shown much more of the workings in how it has reached its conclusions; and it undertakes a regular evaluation of its forecasts, providing a public record to all even when they might be embarrassing.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Liddle for securing this debate and introducing it so cogently. I congratulate him on his appointment as chair of the committee.
The committee’s report, Fortifying the Fiscal Framework, could not be more timely or important. Today, the day of the US mid-term elections, might be a good time to remember that, in 2016, President Trump promised to eliminate US national debt, which was then around $17 trillion. In recent months, it broke through the $40 trillion level—around 130% of GDP. If the US had a fiscal framework, we can be confident that President Trump and Secretary Bessent would pay little or no attention to it. Even if there has been intermittent nervousness in the US Treasury market—arguably caused predominantly by other factors—the US continues to be able to finance itself on internationally competitive terms. So who needs a fiscal framework?
The US, fortunately or unfortunately, is not a representative model in the light of, inter alia, the dollar’s dominant position as the world’s reserve currency. Why do we attach so much importance to a stable fiscal framework? It is of course vital in maintaining confidence—international and domestic—to ensure that, whatever the national borrowing requirement is, the Exchequer pays the lowest possible interest rates. It is also a framework for promoting intergenerational fairness, which I acknowledge needs nuanced analysis but is an important and relevant consideration none the less.
One of the most striking parts of the report is contained in its final pages, in the form of Appendix 4. It shows over 20 changes in fiscal rules since the global financial crisis in 2008. The report correctly acknowledges that the rules should not be set in stone for many decades, but also argues that moving the goalposts this much and this often does not generally engender the very confidence that is the central purpose of the exercise.
My Lords, as a member of the committee that produced this report, I express my gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Wood, and to the committee staff. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, for his excellent chairmanship of the committee and his opening remarks.
I shall make four points. First, when our committee decided to undertake this inquiry, the OBR was experiencing unprecedented levels of publicity and criticism. You would have thought it was directly responsible for the country’s challenging and deeply worrying fiscal situation, rather than consisting of analysts and messengers. A year later, after another Budget, that seems no longer to be true; if there were widespread attacks this year, I missed them. I think that this is because, in the meantime, and in no small part because of the OBR’s work, far more people are aware of our ever-growing national debt and the state of our public finances.
However, while this growing recognition in Westminster and the country is welcome, we are not doing anything very significant about it. To quote the executive summary of the OBR’s own October report, in classically somewhat bland language:
“The UK’s economic and fiscal position remains very challenging”.
It points out that weak growth and government borrowing have resulted in a sharp increase in government debt while debt interest spending is expected to grow yet again by billions of pounds.
Observers of the Budget regularly point out how bizarre it is that so much time and national attention goes on whether or not the Chancellor of the Exchequer is using up her or his headroom, an amount that is a tiny proportion of total public expenditure. However, the reason for this is that we are in fact in hock to the bond markets and in an unnecessary situation where small changes in interest rates are a major daily concern for the Government because of their impact on total debt interest.
My Lords, this is an extremely interesting subject. I thoroughly enjoyed the opening comments from the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, without necessarily endorsing every single one of his points; nevertheless, that is the way to start a good debate on this subject.
When we debate this subject, as we did in the Chamber the other day, it is a little difficult to suppress the feeling that we are attacking it from the wrong end. I am told that our total national debt is just about to pass, or has just passed, £3 trillion. That is a milestone; it is almost too big a number to write on a single piece of paper. Of course, that prospect also includes the very expensive debt interest bill, which is coming in now and will be coming in for years to come—it should be falling, but it is not.
I think it was the 18th-century philosopher Adam Ferguson who said that a nation that burdened with high debt is on the path to decline. He was a bit premature, because things did not quite work out that way in the succeeding century, but that is the possibility if we saddle ourselves with this kind of debt interest. Never mind whether it is inhibiting or encouraging growth, or even what it is doing to inflation: if that is one of the huge bills that is intruding on our national payments and government payments every year—it is, at present, and it is getting bigger all the time—we are in deep trouble.
To say that the Budget, such as the one we have just had, is “steady as she goes” and has not worried the bond markets is not enough. Where she is going is down, so it is “steady as she sinks”. That is what this do-nothing Budget, which fails to begin on the path and halts this fantastic growth, is doing. There is no opportunity for just ignoring the whole thing, like the MMT—modern monetary theory—movement in America, which says that the whole thing is just a myth. That is not right. There are appalling prospects unless we get some sort of grip.
My Lords, the Economic Affairs Committee report, Fortifying the Fiscal Framework, was done in April 2026. To summarise, it said that the UK was
“on a path to unsustainable debt”,
and it urged the Government to introduce a rule to ensure that debt falls in normal times and permit a larger fiscal buffer. The Government’s response is that the rules strike an appropriate balance and their fiscal buffer provides flexibility against future shocks—surprise, surprise.
I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, the noble Lord, Lord Wood, who was chair at the time, and the members of the committee on their report. If you look at the fiscal headroom, the figure that we just talked about, it was £9.9 billion in March 2025, £21.7 billion in November 2025, £23.6 billion in March 2026 and £15 billion in 2030, according to the latest Budget. In context, on the headroom, the average buffer has been over £30 billion from 2010 until 2022. The Office for Budget Responsibility’s average forecast error is £54 billion. Borrowing is 4.4% of GDP in 2025-26, falling to 1.8%, which is £18 billion higher than March’s forecast—some £65 billion over the period. National debt is approaching 100% of GDP. If you look at the other measure on the public sector, the PSNFL, it is 83.2%. Debt interest is now £124 billion, which is £14 billion more than forecast in March, and is more than defence, policing and prisons combined. It is forecast to go up to £147 billion by 2029-30.
The tax burden is the highest on record, at 38.5% of GDP. This is the highest since records began in 1948. Of course, tax never ever matches spending, and spending is 44.3% of GDP in 2025-26. There is therefore a constant deficit but, as we know—and this is surprising, given the backdrop of the geopolitical situation, the challenges we are facing, and the figures I have quoted—we are still managing to grow at about 1% a year: 1.2% this year, 1% next year, and cut from 1.6% because of the Iraq war. The 2% inflation target is now meant to peak at 3.8% in quarter 1 next year. On gilt yields, 10-year gilts were 5.32% on Budget Day, which was the highest in the G7, and 30-year gilts hit 6.04% on 7 October, the highest since January 1998. Greece borrows at a cheaper rate than we do as a country. In the long-term projection, and this is the scary figure, debt is heading for 300% of GDP by 2075-76, on an unchanged policy. There has been rule churn, with nine sets of rules since 2008, and 28 since 1997. The average rule since 2010 lasted just 1.8 years.
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lords, Lord Liddle and Lord Wood, and the committee on a persuasive and thoughtful report.
I must confess to having a love/hate relationship with fiscal rules—love because I am all in favour of fiscal rectitude but hate because, whatever rule is put in place, it is steadily subverted as Governments become fixated on hitting the target while missing the point. I am arguably the author of my own misfortune, since I was Permanent Secretary to the Treasury when five of the 10 fiscal rule regimes, so expertly catalogued by the committee, were put in place.
I recognise and share all the committee’s criticisms of the rules, and last week’s Budget provides further proof of its analysis. Borrowing and debt is higher in every year of the forecast compared to last year’s Budget, but nevertheless the Government meet the rules with broadly the same headroom. That is counterintuitive. I should be clear that that is not a criticism of the macro judgment of the Chancellor’s Budget; I thought that judgment was broadly correct, and I welcome the reception that has been given by the gilt market.
I also welcome the strengthening of the framework in 2024, but the challenge of fiscal policy, as the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, pointed out, is that spending and revenue levels are huge and subject to substantial forecasting error. Left to my own devices, I would set a fiscal target of balancing a Budget—or at least the current Budget—year by year, but such a target would not lend itself to the current fiscal rules framework without having a very large cushion indeed. Fiscal targets therefore have to be set over the medium term. That means they have to be rolled forward year by year, and that provides endless scope for gaming, as just about everyone has pointed out.
No doubt the rules can be further improved, and the committee makes some good suggestions but, as I told successive Chancellors, “Don’t get mesmerised by the rules. Meeting them on their own does not give you credibility. Rather, focus on the substance. If you have a credible plan underpinned by credible tax and spending policies, the markets will reward you”.
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The 2070s may seem a long time away, but when I think about it, 50 years were not a particularly long time away for me. When I first started working as a special adviser in the Callaghan Government, in the midst of the IMF crisis, I would wonder whether my job would last more than a couple of months—that was 50 years ago.
The second key point that is rarely mentioned is that debt interest currently accounts for one in every 13th pound spent by the Government. We spend more servicing our public debt than we do on either education or defence, and it is nearly half what we spend on health. These are enormous numbers. A few weeks ago, I introduced the debate on our report on the demographic challenges of an ageing society. I strongly support our new Prime Minister’s ambitions for a radical reform of social care. In my view, it is fundamental to a decent society, and I admire his courage in deciding to reform the triple lock in order to help pay for it. We all know that social care is a huge commitment for the future. We also know that we have huge, unavoidable but as yet unfunded commitments on defence, which in a dangerous world we simply must meet. But in meeting those targets, let us remember that 270% figure which hangs over us on present trends.
This is why the framework within which the Government set fiscal policy is an essential ingredient ensuring that Governments can set themselves on the path towards sustainable borrowing. Our report looks at two elements of that framework: the fiscal rules themselves, which Chancellors loudly proclaim as non-negotiable; and the institution responsible for assessing the Government’s compliance with them, the much-maligned Office for Budget Responsibility.
On the rules, my personal feeling is that Chancellors protest too much. There is some benefit to the Government sticking to the existing rules, but the rules themselves have been shown to be eminently gameable. Debt is invariably shown to fall as a percentage of GDP in the final year of the plan, and the claim of sticking to the rules has limited value if the spending assumptions for the final years of the fiscal plan are of extremely dubious credibility. The risk of gaming was particularly high when the timescale for meeting the fiscal rules was set at five years. Meeting the rules depended on spending assumptions five years ahead that were unspecified.
The present Government—they are my Government and I support them—have, to their credit, shifted to a three-year rolling target to demonstrate a falling public debt to GDP ratio. I dare say Sir Humphrey would have described this as a brave decision because it means that, from now on, the commitment to lower the debt to GDP ratio is aligned with the Government’s three-year public spending plans, and, in our case, they have to be decided next year. This year’s Red Book implies that the Government’s plans for unprotected departments—that is, other than defence and health—would face real-term cuts of some 2.5% in order to meet that target. If I were a Labour Back-Bencher in the Commons, which I am glad I am not, that commitment might cause me a few uneasy nights of lost sleep. But the whole approach to policy remains Augustinian: we are promising to be fiscally prudent, but just not quite yet.
The committee was also generally concerned with the relentless yearly focus on whether the Government have met the short-term rules for so-called headroom rather than the long-term trends, which are more important. In report after report, the OBR has clearly set out the trajectory for debt; it is manifestly unsustainable but no one seems to take any notice. The Government are ignoring this, and we as a committee were concerned that there is a lack of attention to the annual Fiscal Risks and Sustainability report that the OBR produces. Parliamentary time should be set aside for discussing the Government’s response to this report.
Perhaps one reason for the reluctance to do so is the increasingly meagre content of the response that the Treasury provides. Richard Hughes—the chairman of the OBR before, unfortunately, he had to resign—noted that the Government’s response in 2017 was 136 pages of argument, while the most recent was 19 pages, and it was in the form of a Written Statement to Parliament, which of course was never debated. That is not good enough for such a serious matter. Our committee will do what it can to draw greater attention to the Fiscal Risks and Sustainability report. We will invite the OBR and Ministers to give evidence to our committee each year following its publication. The long-term health of our economy turns on Governments grappling with the issues that the OBR repeatedly highlights.
On the OBR more generally, we welcome the change in tone of the rhetoric that was previously unfairly targeted at it. In contrast to some claims, the OBR does not police government policy; it is merely an impartial judge of the Government’s compliance with rules that they impose on themselves. The Government are always free to disagree with the OBR assessment and make their policy accordingly, if they want to. We also welcome the OBR’s approach to forecasting. Projection is not prediction, and confusion on this point underlies misguided attacks on its work.
We heard of the frustration of some at the OBR not scoring the impact of tax cuts or public investment on its growth numbers, but if the Government genuinely believe in the value of a policy, they should implement it whether or not the OBR chooses to score it. Not to do so because of its approach to scoring would be to reveal a concern with meeting a metric rather than promoting the actual well-being of the economy. The Government should be making policy on the basis of their considered view of the economic fundamentals, not on the basis of what they think will lead to narrowly passing rules that they have imposed on themselves.
In particular, the focus on headroom, and how specific decisions of the OBR affect the result of the headroom calculation, are a product of narrow margins. Between 2010 and early 2022, headroom averaged about £30 billion. One might worry that, with headroom in this October’s Budget now falling to £15 billion, we are returning to a world in which OBR decisions about scoring will again be politicised. These decisions should be dry matters, more suited to footnotes in documents than headline news stories. The amounts that we are considering are, in terms of public spending and borrowing, rounding errors compared to the Government’s total tax and revenue spending. Although we accept that buffers are there to be used in tough times, those buffers should arguably be a lot greater than they are.
Sadly, the fundamentals of our fiscal position remain difficult, and nothing in the Budget last week suggests any meaningful change in the country’s long-term debt dynamics. I am expressing a personal view here, but fiscal sustainability is not just a matter of the scale of public spending and taxation. Personally, I want the Government to throw everything they can at growth; in my book, that must include rejoining the European single market. I want a simpler, radically reformed tax and welfare system that removes the multiple disincentives to work with which we have ended up. I would like to see a much sharper focus on public sector efficiency, where the public sector trade unions recognise that the only sustainable route to higher wages lies in greater public sector productivity.
The fact is that the public finances are on an unsustainable path. Apart from the Government’s brave decision on the triple lock, which I applaud, it is unclear how we are going to address this situation. The Prime Minister says that he is in favour of radical reform of our politics and electoral system to bring more consensus to our politics. Perhaps that is a fundamental change; we will have to see. I beg to move.
If we look at where these targets came from, ultimately, they are derived from our Maastricht targets, which we were meant to obey when we were a member of the European Union. Noble Lords may remember that there were two treaty-driven targets. We were to keep debt at 60% of GDP or lower. Every country bar one, I think, broke that—including the United Kingdom—so it was transposed into something saying, “As you are over 60%, you should start getting your debt down towards a 60% target”; that was transformed into our fiscal rules after we left. There was also the 3% running deficit ceiling, which, again, has been often broken; it was broken by us in our period of membership. This Government have revised and tightened that by saying that there should still be a 3% deficit ceiling, but only to allow 3% of GDP borrowing for capital purposes, and that the aim should be to have a current balance. That is a good amendment to a target that does not work.
Where one needs to go from here is to say, as the committee does, that we are close to running out of money—and the people who lend it to us are close to running out of patience—for us to carry on spending at the rate we are doing. We have had three very big spending increases over the past 20 years: over the banking crash, with a big increase in debt; over Covid; and post Covid. I do not think that enough was done to control the spending coming out of the Covid exceptional expenditure; the extra borrowing was complicated, with a massive programme of quantitative easing. We then had, of course, a very substantial policy decision to go for more spending and more borrowing by the incoming Government in 2024.
I think that we would be much better off if, on a cross-party basis, we could agree on two overarching aims for the UK economy, based on one of our targets at the moment and some of the American experience. We should have as our aims 2% inflation and 2% growth, so that all policy and Bank of Englandconsiderations recognise that there can be trade-offs between those two, and we should embed the 2% inflation target on the Government as well as on the Bank of England, because inflation in public sector costs is one of the main forces of inflation at the moment; that should be taken much more seriously by the public sector.
In the brief time I have, I want to mention two expensive quirks in our figures, which I have highlighted and in which I would like other people to get interested; I find them fascinating, and they might be of use to those conducting public policy. The first is that Rachel Reeves made a decision, which I and my party condemned as being anti-jobs and anti-vacancies, to increase national insurance. The curious financial thing about it was that, of course, the bulk of the national insurance revenue has to be paid into the National Insurance Fund. That is now accumulating a surplus of £12 billion extra each year and has a surplus of £100 billion already, so I am not quite sure why she wanted a bigger surplus in the fund; it has to be lent back to the Government at the base rate.
The second funny money is the dreadful situation with the ownership of bonds by the Bank of England. The latest OBR figure says that the losses will come down a bit: it now thinks that, from 2022, when the losses started, until 2033, the losses will be £228 billion. Can we not get that figure down a bit?
At the same time, we must acknowledge that the 2010 fiscal framework has not been enough to prevent a huge increase in the Government’s debt since 2010, as the noble Lord, Lord Redwood, pointed out. The crucial questions are: how much responsibility lies with the OBR, with the various crises over the past 18 years, or with the specific rules and policies that successive Governments have chosen to follow? There is no time to get into that today, but I will touch on the issue of fiscal rules.
The committee’s report highlights some weaknesses in the rules. The pattern is for the post-Budget forecast to show the debt ratio stabilising or increasing in the first year or two, followed by a decline in the later years. However, this improvement often relies on optimistic public expenditure figures set by the Government, and the projected decline of the debt ratio does not happen; the debt ratio has been stuck at the present level for some years now.
Personally, I am not a fan of short-term Budget rules. The word “rules” seems inappropriate in a world where the likely margin of error around the forecasts is large relative to the fiscal offer. We do not have an inflation rule; we have a target. Why do we have Budget rules? Rules are very difficult to set when there is so much global uncertainty, and the changes that take place inevitably generate suspicion that they are being made to give Governments more discretion and room for manoeuvre.
Governments of course need a strategy for fiscal policy. The committee’s report argues for a greater focus on reducing the debt ratio over time, rather than the endless debate about rules and fiscal buffers. This can be achieved only by bringing down the balance of current spending and income closer to zero. The OBR forecast published last week shows a decline in the deficit, but the question remains: will this be achieved in practice? Once again, the forecast for government spending appears ambitious. Even if it is accurate, the debt ratio is likely to be higher in the final year of the forecast than it was last year.
We now look forward to the forthcoming 10-year plan. It will be another stab at setting out a plan for the future. It is crucial that this next step also includes a compelling pathway to financial sustainability by reducing the debt ratio.
I will not take much more time, as I unequivocally endorse the report’s conclusions and recommendations. The welcome reduction of the rolling forecast period from five years to three could, as the report recommends, usefully be amended further to include the requirement that debt at the end of the third year should be lower than in the first. I hope the Government will reflect on this beyond the initial dead bat that they have played.
I welcome the support given by the committee to the role and performance of the OBR, as well as the appointment of Jonathan Haskel as chair after, inter alia, his distinguished tenure on the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee. I also endorse the support given for the new cycle of two forecasts and one fiscal event each year, whether or not the gap between the forecasts could be evened out to some extent.
I was struck by the evidence given by the economist and journalist Ben Zaranko advocating a broader assessment of financial resilience than the numerical level of headroom, as my noble friend Lord Liddle also argued in his introduction. The fiscal framework should not be overly mechanical in its interpretation and analysis, but the symbol of the financial responsibility and discipline pursued by the Government. If it is not too frivolous, I am reminded—for film buffs—of “Pirates of the Caribbean”, where the pirates’ code is argued to be not so much a code as a guideline.
The Government have made a strong start in stabilising the country’s fiscal position. I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Redwood, that we are anywhere near the point of being unable to cover our financing needs, and this report can further strengthen that position.
Secondly, it is perfectly possible to reduce the national debt. In 1946, after the Second World War, the national debt reached 252% of GDP, but by 2006 it was down to 36%. As our committee has argued in this report, and in its previous 2024 report on debt, we really have to act.
Thirdly, I underline the hugely valuable work done by the OBR in producing its Fiscal Risks and Sustainability reports. As we said in our report, these reports get far too little attention, but, if you want to understand what is going on with the public finances, they are an essential source; I commend them to everybody.
Fourthly, there is a concrete change that this Government and future Governments could, and should, make; in my view, it is the single most important recommendation in this report. The Government should set out an additional debt target that will show cumulative performance over three years, such that, in normal times, debt in the third year is lower than in the first year. That should be easily monitored and clearly understood by the general public. However, this has not been our recent experience. This October’s economic and fiscal outlook predicts that, in 2029, public sector net debt as a percentage of GDP will, again, be significantly higher than was forecast just six months ago.
We are hardly the only people to observe that, all too often, the current and recent fiscal rules allow ample room for gaming the debt target. As a former member of the Budget Responsibility Committee confirmed to us, as a witness,
“you can have debt rising for ever”
and still meet most of the targets that the Government have set for themselves and observe their rules. The committee criticised this situation in 2024, but nothing happened. We called for change in this report, but the Government’s response to our report said:
“The Government has been clear that the fiscal rules are non-negotiable”—
end of subject. Well, the rules may be non-negotiable, but it is beyond time for them to change and for them to be discussed publicly and widely. We need a cross-party commitment on our fiscal framework, including a clear, easily monitored commitment to ongoing debt reduction—and sooner rather than later.
In the country as a whole, there is a feeling that our full productive capacity is not being exploited. The economists have come up with a lot of numbers, a sort of a new fiscal prison. As Keynes faced in the 1930s and 1940s, there is a need for a balanced budget. He pointed out that, if you depart from that prison, there are possibilities of escape to higher living standards and a better-balanced life for the citizens of this country. We are in the same sort of position now. I was wondering why everyone was flocking to this play in the West End about Keynes’s life; it is absolutely full and impossible to get seats. Perhaps the answer is that they are looking for a new Keynes, or what Keynes would have to say in the face of this apparent imprisonment, which seems to bar us from breaking out and realising our full potential.
When it comes to what we do about this, there are only three broad sets of approaches worth considering—three unburdening strategies. The first is doing nothing very much, which is roughly what we are doing now, and hoping that inflation and growth, if there is any, will lift us out of debt through time. We hope that the OBR will nobly reduce its two forecasts a year, plus a single fiscal event, whatever that is meant to be, but we will not actually do anything to affect policy.
The second strategy, which is related, is to talk about cuts—yes, cuts—and a new war on efficiency, the sort of language we had in the last century under every Government from Ted Heath onwards, and promise to have a review next year. I cannot quite see the point of this review next year. For 50 years, we have been reviewing the possibilities on the efficiency side and indeed of transferring whole functions out of the public sector altogether. I have filing cabinets full of suggestions and proposals worked out in enormous detail. There is no need for another review. In the 1970s, we marshalled the 20 ablest brains in the nation to work out how to challenge waste and redefine objectives in every department. They worked very hard; we chose them very carefully. I have to say that, after 18 months, every single one that we brought into government left, because they found a complete wall of obstruction to everything they wanted to do. We had a pamphlet, “A New Style of Government”, which outlined this; it is all ready and sitting there unused.
In my last 30 seconds, I have to say something about transferring functions, because that is the only way that this can be done. The only possible way to reduce the rate of growth of this colossal figure is by reducing functions, which will in turn reduce the number of civil servants—as we did, from 800,000 to 500,000, in the 1970s and 1980s—and the functions of government, as we did on the industrial side. There now has to be a list of new things. I have in my hand a list that anybody can put together, with about £100 billion that could be taken off tomorrow morning. You do not need any reviews at all. It can be done by determined people. It can be done even with parties in the House of Commons that disagree with everything. Some things can happen automatically. I do not have time to read out this list now, but if anyone would like it, I would happily give it to them. It is all around the corner. Reviews can wait for another day. We can act now if we are serious about curbing the enormous growth of this enormous burden.
Where borrowing is concerned, we are scared about this 100% figure, and we should be. To put it into context, at the end of the Second World War, our borrowing was 250% of GDP. After a six-year brutal, horrible war, it reached 250%. It took from 1945 until 1963 to get it down to 100%. Then, in the Gordon Brown years, it came down to 40%. Now we are climbing back up to 100%.
The question before the committee concerns the fiscal rules and the OBR. We have done two major things in recent memory. First, there was the independence of the Bank of England, brought in by Gordon Brown. I think most people would agree having an independent central bank is a good thing and is trusted by businesses and the market. Secondly, the OBR was brought in. Is the OBR doing a good job? Is it forecasting well enough? The £54 billion of average forecast error is quite a frightening thing. The OBR has had a pretty tricky time—for example, leaking its report before Rachel Reeves came to the Dispatch Box, leading to huge embarrassment, the resignation of its director and a new director coming in. So is the OBR a referee, a policeman or a watchdog? Is it to be trusted? I think that on balance we are all going to conclude that yes, it should be there, but is it doing enough when it comes to dynamic scoring? It was agreed that that would probably not work. The OBR’s independence is there to stay.
The noble Viscount, Lord Chandos, spoke about US debt being 130% of GDP, $40 trillion. Its debt interest is higher than its defence spending, which is almost $1 trillion, the highest in the world, and of course it has the dollar as reserve currency.
The bottom line is this: Liz Truss and Kwasi Kwarteng’s Budget in 2022, containing £45 billion of tax cuts paid for by extra borrowing but with no OBR forecast, led to disaster, with the bond markets absolutely reacting. James Carville, Bill Clinton’s adviser in 1993, said:
“I used to think that if there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the President or the Pope or as a .400 baseball hitter. But now I would want to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate everybody”.
It is good that we have the OBR and that we have that independence. We must bring down taxes, welfare spending and borrowing and then generate growth. That will generate the jobs that will pay for our public services.
At the weekend, I ignored the advice of the noble Lord, Lord Blackwater, and read the book by the last Prime Minister but two, Bank Job, in which she argues that the OBR should be abolished. It is always important to expose yourself to different views, and actually it is worth a read—it is quite short—but, sadly, I was not persuaded. In my view, the committee is right to praise the role of the Office for Budget Responsibility. It is not the OBR’s fault if Governments feel constrained; that is the inevitable consequence of sailing too close to the wind. The OBR will never get its forecast right—that is because no forecaster gets forecasts right over and over again—but at least its forecasts are unbiased, unlike the Treasury’s of old. One of the many things I learned there is that, when Governments assumed they had increased the trend rate of growth in the economy, they were invariably deluding themselves.
Between 1945 and 2008, the British economy generally grew by 2.25% a year. Since then, it has grown much more slowly. The OBR’s latest forecast reflects that. Perhaps it assumes that the economy will grow too slowly, but it should attach a high bar to raising its view of the trend growth in productivity. As the committee advises, it should also attach a high bar to the dynamic scoring of policy measures. In my experience, it takes many years, even decades, for any structural reform to feed through to economic growth. I worry that Chancellors and officials of late spend too much time trying to press the OBR to accept their view of the dynamic effects of policy changes. Again, they would be better advised to focus on the substance; if policies have a dynamic effect, they should regard that as a bonus.
Finally, I endorse the committee’s desire to upgrade the status of the OBR’s Fiscal Risks and Sustainability report. You did not have to be a genius to spot the demographic time bomb, which has finally exploded; indeed, I remember working on the Fowler reviews in the 1980s, which were predicated on this demographic time bomb. Setting out its fiscal consequences so lucidly provides a service to a media and political class who have an uncanny knack of ignoring it. Anything Parliament can do to give it a higher profile should be warmly welcomed.