That the Grand Committee takes note of the agreement in respect of Gibraltar between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community of the one part, and the United Kingdom, of the other part.
Relevant document: 2nd Report from the European Affairs Committee (special attention drawn to the agreement)
My Lords, my noble and gallant friend Lord Stirrup asked me to pass on his apologies, because he cannot be with us today, and to speak on his behalf. I can only imagine the disappointment, if your Lordships were expecting the military and a diplomat turned up, but that is how we are today. The one recompense I can give is that I will not, therefore, intervene later in the debate.
Before I speak on behalf of my noble and gallant friend, I need to declare my interests: I was not only negotiating many of the agreements that may be referred to but was part of the early days of this negotiation. If your Lordships look carefully at the evidence, I think they will find that witnesses gently allude to that role when they were asked why it took so long to get an agreement. However, I think one of the reasons was that success was not inevitable, and we should approach this debate in that light.
On behalf of my noble and gallant friend Lord Stirrup, and with his permission, I am introducing the debate today. On 14 July, the UK Government laid before Parliament their agreement with the European Union on Gibraltar. In accordance with the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, Parliament has 21 sitting days to scrutinise the agreement. This period expires on 22 October.
Since this is an agreement with the European Union, it came for consideration before your Lordships’ Committee on European Affairs rather than the International Agreements Committee, which normally reports on international agreements. The European Affairs Committee had to decide whether to report the agreement for the House’s attention or for its special attention and debate. It chose the latter option, given the matter’s political importance in settling one of the major issues outstanding from Brexit.
I note that the agreement does not require the approval of your Lordships’ House. Under the CRaG process, should the other place resolve against ratification of an agreement, a second period of 21 sitting days is triggered to allow for further consideration. That has not happened in this case. Should your Lordships resolve against ratification, the Government may still proceed after laying a statement before Parliament giving their reasons for doing so.
My Lords, Gibraltar has done extremely well over the years, with a very successful service sector-led economy, a very happy relationship with the United Kingdom, and as the possessor of a crucial base for the United Kingdom and NATO. I have always welcomed the close collaboration between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom. I rise to ask some questions of the Minister, because I fear for Gibraltar’s future under some of the details and terms of this agreement with the European Union. It seems to me very one-sided, with plenty of give to the European Union and not very much take for Gibraltar. There are a number of areas where I think we need to scrutinise it very carefully.
The first is the money. Can the Minister give us more information about what the social cohesion payment would be? How much tax do the Gibraltarians have to pay to improve adjacent parts of Spain? Under the alignment mechanisms, is it not the case that business in Gibraltar could find itself the subject of more levies or taxes, which would start to undermine the excellent competitiveness which Gibraltar has enjoyed through her own sensible choices? Part of the success of Gibraltar is relatively light taxation and an effective, but not oppressive, regulatory regime for the services she trades with the world. It would be a great worry if that was impaired or demolished by maybe inadvertent crazy EU actions.
My Lords, this is the first occasion on which I have had the honour to follow the noble Lord, Lord Redwood, in the speakers’ list, and I can assure him that his contribution today will go straight into the fiction part of my library. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Barrow, on standing in at rather short notice for the Chair of his committee and on introducing this report so comprehensively and ably.
I need to begin my contribution with a declaration, not of interest, as I have none, but of involvement. In 1982, when I was Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the FCO with responsibility for relations with the European Communities, I was tasked by Lord Hurd of Westwell, then Minister of State, with trying to bring about the opening of the border between Spain and Gibraltar, closed many years earlier by General Franco as part of his campaign to subvert our sovereignty over Gibraltar. I was asked to do this before any Spanish treaty of accession then being negotiated was brought before the House of Commons for ratification.
After a number of detailed discussions with the then Chief Minister of Gibraltar, Sir Joshua Hassan, whose successor but several I welcome to our audience—I wish the previous speaker had shown a little greater respect for the views of Gibraltarians—and after many meetings with my opposite numbers in Madrid in charge of Spain’s accession negotiations, a basis for lifting the Spanish border closure was established ahead of the ratification of its accession agreement. The result was a resumption of large daily border crossings by Spanish workers with jobs in Gibraltar and, eventually, the arrangements for Gibraltar airport to give access to both Spain and Gibraltar. These arrangements have operated ever since, to the mutual benefit of the UK, Gibraltar, the EU and Spain, although on only an increasingly shaky legal basis since the UK left the EU in 2019. It is their replacement by a properly constituted and negotiated agreement between the EU and the UK that we are debating today, and I hope that we will it give broad support.
My Lords, I begin by welcoming the Gibraltarian delegation attending our debate and saying how very much I appreciate the fact that they are taking so much interest in our deliberations. I had the pleasure of hearing the Chief Minister when he gave evidence to our committee, and that was a very convincing performance. For my part, I not only support the resolution in front of us but I go further and, like my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, I certainly commend this agreement to the Committee.
It must be seen in the context of the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote. This, of course, ran contrary to the wishes of the people of Gibraltar, who believed, rightly in my view, that it was against their own best interests. That, in my view, imposes on the UK Government an obligation to mitigate as far as possible what the people of Gibraltar regard as the harmful consequences to them of Brexit. I think we have a duty to do that. It is against this criterion that we should judge this treaty. The answer is clear, as the unanimous decision of the Gibraltar Parliament shows.
Really, the Gibraltar Parliament is the best judge of the interests of the Gibraltar people, and I was very uneasy to hear my noble friend Lord Redwood explaining to them how they did not see seem to understand what their own best interests were—we in London must not assume that we know better than other people what their own best interests are. The people best able to judge the best interests of Gibraltar are those in the Gibraltar Parliament and not those of us sitting in London. I congratulate the Gibraltar Parliament on its decision and to go against it would be an act of some impertinence on our part.
I congratulate the Government on the agreement, in particular the officials who have negotiated it. I cannot remember a time when disagreements over Gibraltar have not caused trouble for the British-Spanish relationship and difficulties for the people of Gibraltar. The number of officials who have devoted years of their career to working on this problem is legion, and I take heart from the fact that this agreement is an example of what the UK and the EU can achieve when they approach a negotiation in what might be called a success-oriented frame of mind. I hope that the success of reaching agreement over this matter will act as an indication that agreement between us and the EU is possible on other matters as well, and that this will create a precedent.
My Lords, I thank in his absence the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and his committee for a careful and useful report. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Barrow, for standing in at short notice and introducing the debate.
The committee rightly notes in its report that this debate is the only opportunity this House has to consider the treaty in detail. It has been in provisional operation for three months now; it needs no legislation here and, as others have said, cannot be stopped by this House under the 2010 Act.
I repeat what I have said in other debates: after the EU exit, it cannot be right that treaties of such importance can come into force without a clear yes/no vote in this Parliament. One day this process will have to be changed.
In his evidence last month, the Minister was kind enough to suggest that if the committee wanted to know why an agreement was not included in the TCA, “it should get Lord Frost in and ask him”. I am always happy to appear before the committee, but in fact the Minister went on to give more or less the correct answer. Negotiating the biggest trade and co-operation agreement in the middle of a pandemic meant simply that there was not time for everything, particularly given the situation resulting from the EU commitment in 2017 to give Spain, effectively, a veto on any deal, and it was inevitable that this would have to be dealt with separately. I actually think that the interim agreement at the end of 2020 was not a bad agreement in the circumstances, but it was never going to last, and that is why we are where we are now.
We all know the situation in Gibraltar; I know the issues directly as I was for a time the Foreign Office director responsible for Gibraltar after the previous Labour Government’s attempt to reach a so-called shared sovereignty deal. We know that 15,000 people cross the frontier every day. Frontier workers make up about 40% of Gibraltar’s workforce, and restrictions at the frontier always affect Gibraltar’s economy negatively. We know how fraught the issues are; we know the politics of the issue in Spain. We know too that Gibraltar voted overwhelmingly to stay in the EU, and these realities all have to be acknowledged and accepted.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Frost, is overpessimistic. This is a treaty that Gibraltar has studied with great care, and it wants it. I am a member of the parliamentary group and have been going to Gibraltar for many years. In May, I went with Martin Vickers MP; we went as individuals without any remit except what we wanted to do, which was to make a short fact-finding tour to find out what people in Gibraltar thought about what was then, and still is, the draft treaty. We went at our own expense, not as guests of the Gibraltar Government. We met the governor; we then went to the airport, where the Chief Minister took a great deal of trouble to take us through the new double system of entry.
On my later visit in September to Gibraltar, I experienced it as somebody entering. The new system is slow and rather cumbersome, and it takes a very long time to get through. One has to walk miles—I actually said to the Chief Minister that he ought to put some travelators in, but I suspect the passages may not be wide enough. What I understand is that continental and other foreign flights will now be able to take off and land in Gibraltar, which has not been the case in the past. As I understand it, there have not been any alerts yet—and as I also understand it, if somebody is refused entry by Schengen, by the Spanish, they can enter and work and live in Gibraltar, if that is the decision of the Gibraltarians. Although it is a system for two, it works first for Spain and the rest of the EU, and quite separately for Gibraltar. That is what I understand, and I find it difficult to see why people think that this may be a matter of some controversy.
My Lords, as a member of the European Affairs Committee, it is a pleasure to take part in this debate, and I join in the congratulations to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, the chairman of the committee. The noble Lord, Lord Barrow, who is deputising, made an excellent contribution and adds great heft to work of the committee.
I will concentrate substantially on residency and the ramifications for the labour market, but I also want to talk briefly about two much bigger issues. One is the use of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 in the scrutiny and oversight of international treaties and agreements. I believe we have a weak treaty scrutiny regime. The 21-day sitting period for ratification does not require Parliament to scrutinise, debate or even vote on treaties and is poor compared with other jurisdictions, notably the United States Senate, where a two-thirds majority is required to push through a treaty. Little time is given to consider the documents in detail, and now we have no European Scrutiny Committee in the other place that omission is compounded. We cannot influence the terms of arrangements or treaties. The implementation of statutory instruments is subject to scrutiny, but that is not the same as influencing the treaties themselves.
I also want to talk about Brexit. I hate to do it, but I slightly disagree with my noble friend Lord Tugendhat. I take issue with the idea that Gibraltar’s autonomy and decision-making should be central to this issue. They are important, but they are not the primary issue. Gibraltar has 40,000 people; the ancient county of Rutland has 42,000 people, but we do not build foreign policy around the views of the people of Rutland.
The point is that the British Government have a duty and a responsibility to look after the interests of and to observe and respect the democratic will and the parliamentary sovereignty of the United Kingdom, and this treaty, or arrangement, undermines that. Martin Selmayr, then chef de cabinet to Jean-Claude Juncker, famously said in the wake of Brexit in 2016 that the EU had two objectives: first, to make Brexit as difficult as possible—I think it has probably succeeded in that endeavour—and, secondly, to ensure that the UK had no long-term competitive economic advantage over the EU, so we must be unsentimental when we are considering treaties, agreements and arrangements with our friends in the European Union.
My Lords, I add my thanks to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and the noble Lord, Lord Barrow, for taking up the theme, for enabling us to have this important and useful debate on the future of Gibraltar. In saying that, I take a very different view from that of my noble friend Lord Jackson about the role of Gibraltar in the negotiations leading to this agreement.
I declare my interest as a long-standing member and officer of the All-Party Group on Gibraltar and of the All-Party Group on the Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories. Let us not forget the importance of the overseas territories to this country in general. I have also been president of the Friends of Gibraltar Heritage Society for some 25 years and remain a vice-president. The current president is none other than Mr Speaker, Sir Lindsay Hoyle, and the chairman is our very good friend Sir Bob Neill.
I should perhaps explain that my involvement with Gibraltar started when I was elected as a Member of the European Parliament representing Liverpool in 1979, in the first elections to the only directly elected Parliament in the history of the world. The citizens of Gibraltar, while being part of the then European Economic Community, did not, however, have the right to vote in those first historic direct elections. So the then Chief Minister, Sir Joshua Hassan, to whom the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, referred, decided to approach 12 Members of the European Parliament—six Labour and six Conservative. I was fortunate in being one of those, and my noble friend Lord Tugendhat was one of the two British commissioners to the EEC at the time. Under the leadership of the then Lord Bethell, we campaigned to ensure that Gibraltarians could vote, and that was something that came into effect when the voting system changed to a regionalist system and it therefore became more possible. So, however many difficulties there are in the distance of Gibraltar from this country and its separation, overcoming them is very important.
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.
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The agreement has been operating provisionally since mid-July, and the expectation is that the UK Government will ratify it once the CRaG period expires. The EU ratification process is already under way. The committee’s report does not constitute an inquiry into the agreement: the CRaG process does not allow sufficient time for such an investigation; the report is more in the nature of a guide to the agreement, setting out its background and key features, with the aim of helping the reader to navigate a lengthy and complex document.
The committee was, however, able to take evidence from the noble Lord, Lord Wood of Anfield, who is the responsible Minister in the FCDO, and from the Chief Minister of Gibraltar, the honourable Fabian Picardo, setting out the perspectives of the UK and Gibraltar Governments. We also received a written submission from the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Gibraltar. We are grateful to them all for their assistance, and their evidence is attached as annexes to the report. I am also grateful to the staff of the committee for all the support they provide.
Gibraltar was not included in the trade and co-operation agreement that formalised the UK’s post-Brexit relationship with the EU. This left open the question of the broader arrangements between Gibraltar and Spain, arrangements that are of fundamental importance to the economies of Gibraltar and the adjacent region of Spain. Resolving the issue was not, however, a matter for them but for the UK and the EU. Nevertheless, in 2021, the UK Government agreed with Gibraltar a joint approach to the subsequent negotiations that sought to secure the future prosperity of Gibraltar and its surrounding region, to bring confidence, legal certainty and stability to the lives and livelihoods of the people of Gibraltar and its neighbouring communities, and to ensure fluid and open movement of people and goods between Gibraltar and the EU.
In March 2021, the then Foreign Secretary, the right honourable Dominic Raab, gave an assurance that the UK would not agree to arrangements under which sovereignty over Gibraltar would pass to another state or reach an agreement with which Gibraltar was not content. This undertaking was repeated by the new Government in September 2024, following the general election earlier that year. A draft UK-EU agreement was published on 26 February 2026 and was debated in March by the Gibraltar Parliament. Ahead of that debate, the Chief Minister published three separate legal opinions stating that the agreement did not undermine UK sovereignty or jurisdiction over Gibraltar. At the conclusion of the debate, the Gibraltar Parliament agreed unanimously to call upon the UK Government to ratify the agreement subject to two conditions: that Gibraltar reach a concordat with the UK that the agreement cannot be terminated without Gibraltar’s consent and that any decision by the Gibraltar Government to terminate the agreement will be subject to a referendum. The concordat was signed on 14 July 2026.
The final agreement has now been laid before Parliament. It is in seven parts and contains 43 annexes. The main sections cover: common and institutional provisions; circulation of persons; economy and trade; frontier workers; financial provisions; dispute settlement; and final provisions. I will not try your Lordships’ patience by going into the specifics of each section, which I am anyway sure noble Lords have all read in detail already. Rather, I will highlight a few issues on which noble Lords may wish to reflect.
Part 1 includes a section on dispute resolution. It provides for the role of the European Court of Justice in adjudicating on the interpretation of EU law. This reflects existing arrangements in the withdrawal agreement. It also specifically excludes disputes regarding Gibraltar’s sovereignty and/or jurisdiction. Part 1 also makes it clear that in areas covered by the agreement, Gibraltar is required to align its domestic law with that of the EU, so-called dynamic alignment. The wider issue of dynamic alignment is the subject of a current inquiry by your Lordships’ Committee on European Affairs.
Part 2 contains detailed rules on border procedures for entry into and exit from Gibraltar. It is worth noting that decisions on these are a matter for the Government of Gibraltar, not for the UK. Importantly, non-resident members of the UK Armed Forces and their family members are exempt from passport and visa regulations and from Schengen checks. More generally, the FCDO Minister then responsible, Stephen Doughty, told the other place on 8 July that the operational autonomy of the UK’s military facilities in Gibraltar was unchanged by the agreement. The noble Lord, Lord Wood, confirmed this when he gave evidence to us, adding that there is no Spanish role in approving, authorising or controlling UK military operations, UK personnel, deployments or military movements. That is absolutely clear.
Part 3 of the agreement establishes a customs union between the EU and Gibraltar. This will have an impact on trading goods, but Gibraltar’s economy is based largely on services which are not covered by the agreement.
Part 4 contains provisions for frontier workers, an issue of fundamental importance to Gibraltar’s economy. In his evidence to the committee, the Chief Minister confirmed that some 15,500 people come through the frontier every day to work in Gibraltar. Only half of them are Spanish, and one-quarter of them are British.
Article 5 commits to a financial mechanism aimed at promoting cohesion in the region. The cost of this is unclear, but the Chief Minister confirmed to the committee that Gibraltar would be responsible for funding it. Final provisions in Part 7 include a clause under which the parties agree to review the implementation of the agreement after no more than four years, and at regular intervals thereafter. Either party may terminate the agreement at any time, with 12 months’ notification. It may also be terminated if the UK, in respect of Gibraltar, does not accept and implement a new EU Act falling within the scope of the agreement. This is subject to a failure of the co-operation council to agree on an alternative arrangement within 90 days. In addition, either side may terminate if it is dissatisfied with the operations agreement after the review conducted at or before the four-year point. Spain, if it so wishes, may at that time request the EU to begin the process of termination. The UK is, of course, bound by the concordat it has signed on that matter.
There is naturally an enormous amount of detail in the agreement. But considering it in the round, noble Lords may wish to reassure themselves that the objectives set out by the Government in 2021, and reiterated by their successor Administration in 2024, have been met. Noble Lords may wish to note the Chief Minister’s view that, since early logistical teething issues at the border, the new system has been working effectively since its provisional introduction on 14 July.
Finally, your Lordships will no doubt wish to take into account the view of the Gibraltarians themselves, as expressed through the outcome of their own parliamentary process. For them, this agreement resolves some fundamental issues which they faced in the wake of Brexit, which, unaddressed, threatened to derail the functioning of the territory. With those points in mind, I beg to move.
If you look at Gibraltar’s sovereignty, it is clearly badly impaired because Gibraltar will now be under European Union law and will have to adopt all European law in the relevant areas as it comes forward. That seems to me very foolish, given the excellence of Gibraltar as a self-regulating territory within the United Kingdom family; it has put together very good business and economic success, but how can it be sure that that will not be impaired by bad laws and oppressive regulation? After all, Signor Draghi, a great hero of saving the euro and the European scheme, has himself penned an excoriating report about the lack of economic progress and growth in the European Union. He blames excessive lawmaking and overregulation, and has been one of the influences trying to persuade the EU that it should be reducing the number of regulations it imposes.
Although there have been warm words to that effect at the Council of Ministers and from the Commission, there is absolutely no evidence that they going to do it, because we see every month that more laws are passed, more regulations imposed and higher costs made mandatory. Let us look, for example, at the energy situation, where adopting the acquis in energy means carbon pricing, emissions trading and large carbon taxes to guarantee that the EU—and Gibraltar attached to it—will be hopelessly uncompetitive with, for example, the United States of America, which does not impose similar burdens on its own activities.
There is then the issue of the control, or non-control, of the border. We know that the land border will be treated very differently from the air and maritime border. The land border removes its controls, but it will of course be shaped by Schengen. It is very clear that the main driver of land border decisions, made jointly by Spanish EU officials and Gibraltarian officials, will be under European control and will clearly be designed mainly to favour the movement of Spanish and EU citizens across the border in Gibraltar. I appreciate that there are some restrictions on them then gaining citizenship of Gibraltar, but Gibraltar needs to think very carefully about how it provides even temporary accommodation. Gibraltar is providing a great asset to the part of Spain adjacent to Gibraltar, which tends to be an area of rather low incomes and higher unemployment. Gibraltar is a more prosperous area with much fuller employment and much higher incomes. The transfers are daily and will continue to be one-way, favouring the EU and Spain.
We are told that joining the customs union is no problem, because Gibraltar does not export many goods. However, the main problem with a customs union is that it requires often hefty tariffs on imports. That will affect Gibraltar fundamentally, because part of the lifestyle of Gibraltarians rests on being able to import good-value products from around the world. Being forced into the EU customs union will mean that they then can buy only dear European goods or alternatives from elsewhere in the world with high tariffs, in many cases designed by the European Union to thwart the Gibraltarian customer and get them to buy the inferior or dearer EU product. The customs union is a particular blow to Gibraltar. I have long been an advocate that the United Kingdom should not go anywhere near the customs union again—how proud I was that we stripped tariffs from 2,000 line items when we came out of the European Union. We had a rule that, if we did not make or grow the thing ourselves, there should be no tariff on it. Why burden yourself with extra costs for something that you cannot make or grow? In Gibraltar’s case, there are many things, naturally, that a small population cannot make or grow. It would be silly to burden it with very high tariffs in the way that the EU would demand for its own purposes.
I am also concerned about the airport. It is an MoD base, and I believe it is leased for commercial and civilian purposes. We should understand that its primary task was as a very important air base as part of NATO. That needs to be fully baked in. I am told that people who have read the legal detail are reassured that the MoD will continue to be able to take priority if needs arise. However, it seems an unnecessary encumbrance to put this under some kind of joint management and control when it is very clearly a Gibraltar-UK facility and very important part of the NATO arrangements. The idea will be to manage the airport in a way that encourages aviation within the EU and makes aviation more difficult with the rest of the world, which is not necessarily a good thing for a population trading international services in the English language, where they are more likely to do that with places that are not in the EU itself.
Looking at these various problems—I will not give the Committee many more—this seems to me a very one-sided transaction. I can see why the EU wants it: it will get money from Gibraltar; it will tax and regulate Gibraltar to bring it more into line with EU practice; and it will want to develop and change Gibraltar’s economy so that it is more dependent on imports from Spain and the rest of the EU. It will want to undermine Gibraltarian consumers trying to buy cheaper and better things more widely from the rest of the world.
As alignment of laws is ever more detailed, it is highly likely that the way in which people conduct services and business, set up businesses and are taxed will be adversely affected, so I strongly recommend a great dose of scepticism about this transaction. Gibraltarians should be very careful about it because, despite the immediate joy of removing a few of the barriers on the land frontier and allowing people to come to Gibraltar from Spain and do their jobs more easily, there will be all sorts of other consequences, of which I have mentioned a few, which could be extremely damaging to the long-term economic future of what is a priceless jewel: a very successful free-trading service economy, of which many of us are proud.
Since the 1980s, much water has flowed under many bridges, but the essentials have not changed. Most importantly, the Brexit vote in 2016 created an anomalous and aberrant outcome. The UK as a whole voted to leave the EU by a small margin, and the Gibraltarians voted by 99% to remain in the EU. In effect, that UK vote removed Gibraltar from the EU, since its inclusion was derived only from being a European territory which was part of a member state. If ever there was a case for separate and special treatment, this is surely it. Otherwise, what weight are we giving to our quite rightly reiterated view that Gibraltarians should have a real say over their own destiny?
Since Brexit, the Governments of the UK and the EU, with Spain having a key voice, have been negotiating a viable solution. The present Chief Minister of Gibraltar, Mr Fabian Picardo, who is among us today, and successive —quite a few—British Governments and Spanish ones have negotiated with great perseverance and determination. As a member of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Gibraltar, I can bear testimony to that, since the Government of Gibraltar have been meticulous at keeping us informed. The agreement before us today is the outcome of those negotiations. Has anything had to be conceded over sovereignty or other matters of crucial importance to reach the complex arrangements for handling Schengen and customs union issues? I do not believe so, nor do Gibraltar’s Government and its assembly, which have endorsed what has been negotiated. I hope we can lend our support to them through this debate and through the Government’s subsequent ratification.
What could be the consequence of the UK not ratifying and rejecting the agreement reached, which, of course, this Committee does not have the right to recommend anyway? We have some idea of that because of our experience during General Franco’s closure of the border. It would be very costly. It was some hundreds of millions of pounds in the 1970s and no doubt a great deal more now. There would also be difficulties for our defence arrangements in Gibraltar, which are fully safeguarded by the present agreement—both points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Redwood. I would argue that considerations of principle and of practice point us towards supporting the agreement wholeheartedly, as I do.
In conclusion, I recognise, of course—how could I not, after listening to my noble friend speak?—that some noble Lords see the creation of the EU-Gibraltar customs union, and all that follows from it, as a derogation of sovereignty. It is certainly new, in so far as the policy areas covered by the treaty are concerned, that Gibraltar will be subject to a different set of rules from the rest of the UK. I remind noble Lords of what Geoffrey Howe so wisely pointed out, goodness knows how many years ago, when he explained that one of the attributes of sovereignty is the ability it gives to share with others, if we believe that that is in the best interests of the UK or of some part of the UK. That is not a surrender of sovereignty, it is a constructive use of sovereignty. This agreement is a very good example.
I certainly commend this agreement. I congratulate those who negotiated it; I wish the people of Gibraltar success and prosperity as the years go forward under the aegis of this agreement.
I understand why a fluid border—to use what is apparently the new term of art for these circumstances— for people and goods between Gibraltar and Spain is so important and why achieving it is so important to Gibraltar. That is the context for the concerns that I shall go on to express.
The first is the airport, and particularly border control. It is all carefully hedged but, for the first time, Spanish officials will be carrying out border checks on arrivals into British territory. Under the treaty’s provisions, they can search British travellers arriving in the course of border control and demand their fingerprints. That is new. What is less clear to me, even now—having read the treaty and all the evidence sessions around it—is that there nevertheless still seems to be some unclarity about how the interaction between Spain and Gibraltar will work in this area, or perhaps has been working for the last three months. It is not clear who has the final say and who is really constrained in their discretion here.
To take just one example, the Minister said in his evidence session:
“When an individual is the subject of an alert on the Schengen Information System … or they do not meet the requirements for entry into the Schengen area, Spain may refuse them entry into Schengen. In those circumstances … the Government of Gibraltar have taken their own decision to mutually recognise decisions taken by Spain to refuse entry … based on security or public safety concerns”.
From subsequent discussion in the evidence session, it seems that this is automatic.
Like others, I am delighted to see the Chief Minister here today. When he was asked about this, he said that,
“Gibraltar would make its decision and, if it permits the individual to come in, the individual goes to the Schengen check also to be permitted access to Schengen. If that individual is permitted access to Schengen they have no problems. If we permit access to Gibraltar but access to Schengen is not permitted, the individual has the right to visit only Gibraltar and not Schengen”.
Maybe I am missing something here, but I am not quite sure how these two statements can be reconciled—maybe they describe slightly different situations—unless the right to enter Gibraltar is a right unable to be exercised in practice, only in theory. I will have some questions for the Minister on this, but I will move on.
My second concern is hot pursuit. I asked the then Ministers about this in June last year. The answer was that Article 41 of the Schengen convention would not apply, but it has subsequently become clear that that has largely been reproduced in this treaty. Spanish officers will be able to follow suspects into Gibraltar by land; there are safeguards, but the principle has been conceded.
The third is dynamic alignment arrangements in the treaty. Under Article 19, if Gibraltar does not accept and implement a new EU Act, the whole arrangement ends unless the co-operation council can agree an alternative within three months. We are now becoming familiar with the arrangement by which disputes about the meaning of EU law are sent by an arbitration panel to the ECJ. Gibraltar now has a customs union with the EU, which takes it out of British trade policy for goods. All this means a loss of control.
My fourth concern is the exit clauses. Under the concordat, as the noble Lord, Lord Barrow, noted, the UK has undertaken that it will not terminate the treaty, except in the most exceptional circumstances, unless three-quarters of Gibraltar’s Parliament or a referendum support it. The committee also notes that the concordat
“does not constrain the EU’s own rights of termination or suspension”.
Under Article 66, the EU will take the necessary steps to end the agreement if Spain so requests, so Spain has a sword of Damocles over Gibraltar. In a way, it always has had such a sword, but it has been given a new legal and usable version of it, which future Governments in Spain may seek to use as leverage. Since the current Spanish Government may—I personally hope they will—lose the election and may be succeeded by one that tends to be more aggressive on Gibraltar questions, this is maybe not an entirely theoretical question.
Those are the concerns I have about this treaty. Where does this leave things? The Chief Minister, whose long service to the people of Gibraltar I acknowledge as he prepares to stand down, told the committee that:
“I can put my hand in the Gibraltarian political fire and tell you that not an iota of our sovereignty has been compromised”.
He is correct in the sense that Gibraltar or the UK can always denounce the agreement, just as the UK could always leave the EU if it did not like its sovereignty-destroying effects, but as long as Gibraltar is part of this agreement, it is losing sovereignty in the sense that it does not have a say in the laws that govern it. It is subject to a legal system in certain areas over which it has no say, and if it does not adopt EU laws in a long list of areas, and cannot persuade the EU to accept alternatives, it loses the entire treaty.
Gibraltar’s rights to allow entry to British citizens and third-country nationals are compromised, shall we say, in practice, and it is not clear to me—I will come back to this—whether it has rights to refuse entry to Schengen nationals at all. I note there was some unease in Gibraltar about some of these terms from the opposition and Sir Peter Caruana, among others, but not going so far as to oppose the treaty. I think they are right to be uneasy. I think we all have a right to comment on this, and my view is that I do not think that this treaty is going to be good for Gibraltar in the long run, assuming it wants to stay part of the UK orbit. Of course, there are gains on the border, but there are also losses in important areas, such as the import of food and goods, border controls and information-sharing, taxation and so on. It seems inevitable to me that, over time, the effect of this treaty will be to produce a tilt towards Spain and the EU and away from the UK. Gibraltar must live with the constant risk that the treaty will be denounced if it is insufficiently compliant. There are plenty of points of leverage. To me, that is a pity.
That said, there is no suggestion, indeed quite the contrary, that Gibraltarians do not want this deal. It passed in Parliament unanimously. There is no suggestion that HMG have put pressure on Gibraltar to accept it. So be it on every question, except I think those pertaining to the military base itself. I do not think that the Government can be more sovereigntist than the Gibraltarians themselves. I would rather something different had been agreed, but I do not oppose it. If Gibraltar has decided that this is the price of the working frontier, I do not think it is for us to overrule Gibraltar, and I do not even think, in contrast to the reset proper, that a future Government should reverse it.
However, we have to recognise that this treaty changes something in the relationship and things may not be in future as they have been before. There is only so much cover this country can give Gibraltar in the areas where it has ceded sovereignty, and in those areas, Gibraltar and its authorities are going to have to find an accommodation over time from a position of weakness with the EU and Spain if it wants those arrangements to continue. I regret that, I do not oppose it, but that is the situation that the treaty has created, and I think we ought to be honest about it.
To finish up, I have a small number of questions for the Minister. Let us come back to the travel question on arrivals by air or sea. If a British citizen arrives in Gibraltar for tourism and the Spanish refuse Schengen access, can that person still enter Gibraltar—yes or no? If a Brit arrives to work in Gibraltar with a residence permit and the Spanish refuse access to Schengen, can that person still enter Gibraltar to work or live—yes or no? Can Gibraltar refuse entry to Schengen nationals? I think that the Minister promised to clarify this at the evidence session. If I missed the clarification, I apologise, but I could not find one, so I would be interested in the answer to that question. Furthermore, could the Minister give a clear statement of what this Government will do if a future Spanish Government use any of these arrangements to put further pressure on Gibraltar in any area? What is the Government’s view on Gibraltar’s opposition requests for a stronger concordat? Is this something that is being considered? Finally, do the Government have in mind any arrangements for reporting to Parliament on the treaty and its operation over time?
I end where I began. An important treaty has come into force with no vote and no power for us to stop it. It does bring real gains for Gibraltar, and I do not deny them, but it also hands Spain and the EU a variety of new legal weapons to be used against Gibraltar. Gibraltar has made its choice, and I accept it. We are not losing Gibraltar and sovereignty over it—I agree with that—but we are sort of sharing it more than we ever have before, it seems to me. I think a bit of honesty about this would be welcome. Dynamic alignment and outsourcing of legal powers is a bargain whose terms are easy to sign and sometimes hard to live with. I hope that I am wrong, but I fear that future Ministers here and in Gibraltar, perhaps facing a less friendly Government in Madrid, will come to understand the risks of what has been agreed, and maybe even come to regret it.
After visiting the airport, we met the commissioner of the British base. We were assured, as is absolutely clear, that the treaty has no effect on the sovereignty and working of the base. But there is co-operation with the Spanish in the provision of a Spanish military liaison officer with very limited remit. We were told that an American nuclear submarine had visited the previous day. I also understand that Americans visit the base regularly and frequently. It is clear that the Americans recognise the importance of the base, its role and its strategic position in NATO. We talked to retailers on Main Street who, like those in many other countries including our own, are having problems. They had reservations about the impact on them of the treaty, but no one opposed it. They looked at the good of Gibraltar as more important, as one particular retailer said, than the fact that he might have to close down.
We visited the commissioner of police, who has many internal problems that clearly need to be sorted. The Chief Minister very kindly gave us lunch, and we met other Ministers. We also met the leader of the opposition, who understandably raised issues and some objections. However, it is noticeable that in the Gibraltar Parliament, the opposition supported the treaty. We went to the hospital, which had practical problems in moving a patient to a Spanish hospital, having to either transfer the patient at the frontier and put the patient into a Spanish ambulance or use a Spanish ambulance in Gibraltar. That problem is now sorted, and it can use their own ambulance drivers.
We discussed the implication of the treaty on the university with the vice-chancellor. She referred to the new immigration rules, and we noted in our report that the university would closely assess the import on its attractiveness to prospective students from around the world. Research funding has been difficult since Brexit, and the vice-chancellor hoped that it might be eased with the conclusion of the treaty.
We had an interesting discussion with the CEO of the very large Morrisons superstore. She was clear that Brexit was a disaster, particularly for the store, and that the treaty was not much better. It might have to reduce the products it offered, perhaps from 20,000 to 19,000 or 18,000. I rather wonder whether the customers will notice much difference. She was hopeful that customers would come across the frontier as they already do, but in greater numbers. I gather that buses are now provided in Spain that bring people over to shop in Morrisons. She said that Morrisons would do as it had always done: it would cope.
The conclusions of our report are contained in the written evidence of the APPG to the European Affairs Committee. I particularly thank the Chief Minister and his team, particularly the UK representative, for their great help in helping our trip. It was extremely interesting and most instructive.
The first and most important element of the treaty is the retention of the sovereignty of Gibraltar to retain its position with the UK and make its own decisions. As we know, the British base is outside the treaty. I learned a word that I do not think I have ever previously used: fluidity. It seems to be the basis of the treaty that flows from these 1,000 pages. It means that 15,000-plus people cross the frontier every day without going through entry and exit requirements, at least half of whom work in Gibraltar. This is crucial to Gibraltar, as the workers from the small town La Línea on the other side of the frontier are a huge part of the Gibraltar workforce. It is also crucial for La Línea, as it is a poor town, and the main part of its workforce crosses the frontier every day. Fluidity means that Gibraltar has freedom to cross the frontier under a special arrangement without joining the EU—a bespoke arrangement with the EU and, I believe, probably the only one of its kind.
As we know, Brexit had an adverse effect on Gibraltar. It has had six years of uncertainty and can now move forward, knowing where it stands and with great prospects ahead. The treaty does not cost the UK a single penny —that is to say, other than the hours, days, weeks, months and years of the hard work and perseverance of Foreign Office officials and Ministers of the Governments here and in Gibraltar. All our Ministers, especially Stephen Doughty and the noble Lord, Lord Wood, are to be congratulated for holding the line, engaging and ending with a workable treaty. Even more to be congratulated are the Chief Minister, the Deputy Chief Minister—both here—and the Attorney-General. I must say that all participants have worked with tenacity, huge patience and ultimate success in creating a treaty, which the Chief Minister has said is not perfect, but is good enough and hugely to be welcomed. Gibraltar is understandably very pleased with it.
I want to make a comment about the European Court of Justice, which was referred to earlier. When I was a judge, I visited Luxembourg, met the judges and sat in the court many times. I listened to the arguments and the judgments. I find it difficult to understand the noted lack of enthusiasm for the court in this country. It made a number of extremely sensible judgments needed, if not wanted, by the UK. It has only an advisory role, which I am sure it will carry out extremely well.
I would also like to say something brief about the concordat between the United Kingdom and Gibraltar. It is a very sensible agreement which answers many of the points of concern which have been raised, notably in the debate in the other place and by two noble Lords today. It sets out how both Governments give effect to the obligations under the treaty, including how the committees created under the treaty will work. I have to say, and it has already been referred to, that I worry a bit about the impending Spanish elections in November. The treaty will be completed in Brussels in December before a new Spanish Government are likely to be in place. The treaty is between the EU and the UK, not Spain and Gibraltar, and seems to be sufficiently robust to withstand criticism, but Gibraltarians may need in the future to ignore hostile rhetoric. All of us who care about Gibraltar ought to be very glad about the new treaty and welcome it. I wish Gibraltar a happy and prosperous future.
There is an issue of sovereignty. Notwithstanding the legal advice that has been received on Article 2, which, no doubt, the Minister will pray in aid, the treaty diminishes UK sovereignty by backing Gibraltar into the Schengen regime. The Spanish Government’s summary confirms that Spain will carry out Schengen controls at the airport and port. Spain may object to the issuing or renewal of residency permits on specified grounds, and Gibraltar will be compelled to notify Spain of all current residence permit holders. Also, Spain is authorised on behalf of the EU to issue short-stay visas for individuals wishing to visit Gibraltar.
On a related matter, and this has been raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, I am concerned at the potential reach of the CJEU and the requirement dynamically to align domestic legislation with the EU as it is developed and updated under Articles 19 and 20 of the treaty—a significant erosion of sovereignty. We know that the EU is always, in terms of dispute resolution mechanisms, jealous of its autonomy and strictly adheres to interpretation of the acquis by the CJEU, often to the disadvantage of the other party. Will the Minister confirm that the Government will take a robust approach on this issue? Similarly, will he reassure us that Articles 22 and 23 of the agreement, in respect of the co-operation council and special committees and their ability to amend the agreement, will not be exercised without good reason and in anything other than exceptional circumstances? On dynamic alignment and the single market, is the Minister in a position to estimate the likely financial obligation that Gibraltar will need to meet by way of financial contributions to the regional cohesion fund?
I will leave my noble friends to interrogate the Minister on the customs union and trade implications, but the following are a few of the outstanding unresolved issues that His Majesty’s Government may wish to address. The treaty does not allow the gaming industry in Gibraltar to serve EU customers directly. The costs of transaction and the tax implications of transaction rules and state aid alignment costs, especially in retail and trading firms, is not altogether clear. The treaty ends Gibraltar’s long-standing VAT-free regime in favour of Spain’s tax equalisation policy, and we know that Spain is not a slacker in respect of the collection of taxes that are due.
Finally, as I raised it in the committee with Mr Picardo, the Chief Minister, I wish to focus on Gibraltar’s new residency regime and the labour market implications. I interrogated the Chief Minister for very good reasons. To be fair, he was kind enough to write promptly to the committee to address some of the issues that I had raised in the meeting. This is an aspect of the implementation of the new arrangement to which I very much hope the Minister will give careful consideration. Three provisions seem particularly troubling. First, a new employee seeking residence in Gibraltar must ordinarily earn at least £37,500 per annum. This is a remarkably high threshold for residency. It excludes many junior and early-career jobs as well as a range of perfectly respectable occupations from the normal route to living in Gibraltar. There are exceptions, including arrangements for applicants under 30 and governmental discretion in other cases, but they do not remove the fundamental problem.
A British citizen offered a job in Gibraltar paying £30,000 may be perfectly entitled to work in Gibraltar but will not ordinarily qualify to live there. Where is that person expected to live? The answer, of course, is Spain. This creates a potentially extraordinary distortion in the labour market. A Gibraltarian employer wishing to recruit someone already resident across the border in Spain does not face the same practical relocation problem as when recruiting a British citizen from the United Kingdom. There is therefore an obvious incentive to recruit from the existing Spanish-resident cross-border workforce. The long-term political and demographic consequences of such an incentive, quite apart from the economic consequences, deserve serious consideration by the Government.
Secondly, there is the age restriction. Under the ordinary eligibility criteria, an applicant must be aged 55 or younger. The Chief Minister has discretion to admit somebody above that age where that is considered to be in Gibraltar’s interest, but that does not remove the fundamental distinction that an otherwise entirely suitable British citizen aged over 55 no longer falls within the ordinary route to residence simply because of his or her age. Indeed, Gibraltar’s own published guidance states:
“The purpose of the age requirement is to make sure people contribute to the economy for a significant period before they are entitled to live in Gibraltar longer term”.
But the economic consequences begin well before the age of 55. Consider a 49 year-old senior professional with a spouse and children contemplating moving his family to Gibraltar, buying a home and establishing the remainder of his career there. Would he reasonably make that commitment if he was uncertain about his ability to remain after retirement?
This brings me to a related and perhaps even more fundamental issue. For a new British resident, the pathway to Gibraltarian status now requires 20 years of residence. Gibraltarian status ultimately provides an unrestricted right to reside in Gibraltar. What, therefore, is the secure, long-term position of a British citizen who moves to Gibraltar, works and pays taxes there for, say, 10 or 15 years and establishes a home and family there but then retires before completing the 20 years necessary to apply for Gibraltarian status?
Thirdly, residence permits under the new regime are renewed annually. How is somebody expected to confidently move a family, establish a career, purchase a home or make a substantial long-term investment in Gibraltar when residence is subject to renewal every 12 months?
Taken together, these provisions seem capable of producing precisely the opposite result of what one might have expected after such a lengthy negotiation. They have the potential to discourage younger and early-career British workers through the threshold; to discourage older British citizens through the age criteria; to create uncertainty for professionals approaching retirement; to discourage families from making long-term commitments through annual renewals; to incentivise employers to recruit people already resident in Spain rather than British workers who would need to relocate; to transfer residential demand from Gibraltar to Spain; and to weaken both the lower and upper ends of Gibraltar’s residential property market.
I have some final questions for the Minister. Are the £37,500 income threshold, the age-55 criteria and the annual residence renewals required directly or indirectly by the agreement, or are they policy choices made by the Government of Gibraltar? What secure route exists for a British citizen admitted under the new regime who establishes his or her life in Gibraltar but retires before completing the 20 years required to apply for Gibraltarian status? Have the Government of Gibraltar assessed whether these rules create an incentive for employers to recruit workers already resident in Spain rather than British citizens from the UK? Have the Government assessed the resulting implications for Gibraltar’s demographics and residential property market and, more broadly, for the maintenance of Gibraltar’s British character? Why is annual renewal considered appropriate for people whom Gibraltar wishes to encourage to make substantial and long-term professional, family and financial commitments to Gibraltar?
The central question seems a simple but important one: which of these restrictions were genuinely necessary to implement the treaty and which were decisions taken independently by the Government of Gibraltar? I hope that the Minister will be in a position to answer these questions in lieu of the Chief Minister, who will unfortunately be Trappist-like today, unlike at our committee.
This agreement ties up the final post-Brexit loose end, but it is flawed. Once again, it diminishes and undermines the UK’s status as an independent, democratic, sovereign, self-governing nation.
At the United Nations this month, the United Kingdom Government restated that they will not enter into arrangements under which the people of Gibraltar would pass under the sovereignty of another state against their freely and democratically expressed wishes. Of course, Gibraltar’s Parliament unanimously called on the United Kingdom to sign and ratify the treaty. Under the UK-Gibraltar concordat, the UK will not, other than in the most exceptional circumstances, move to end it—unless three-quarters of that Parliament or a majority in a referendum supports that.
In 2001, when speaking in a debate in the House of Lords, I referred to the border controls causing a daily irritation to anybody attempting to cross, especially to the workers coming in from Spain on a daily basis. However, since 15 July, there have been no immigration checks at the frontier, and the treaty protects that fluidity with enforceable remedies, consultations within 30 days, or 20 days in urgent cases, and then binding arbitration. So that particular difficulty has been catered for.
Gibraltar’s own officers remain responsible for entry into Gibraltar. Spanish officers carry out the separate Schengen check at the airport but cannot stop Gibraltar residents entering Gibraltar. The airport has its own sovereignty and safeguards—RAF control and military use are unaffected. The terminal stays in Gibraltar government ownership; a joint venture with Spain will only select and supervise the civil operator by public tender, narrower than the 2006 Córdoba arrangements envisaged.
In repeating, inevitably, some important points that have already been made, in terms of the actual agreement and treaty, I believe that we should follow the very clear voice of the people of Gibraltar, its present Chief Minister and its former Chief Minister, who is with us.