Northern Ireland, Scottish and Welsh legislative consent granted. Relevant documents: 3rd Report from the Constitution Committee, 7th and 11th Reports from the Delegated Powers Committee.
Northern Ireland, Scottish and Welsh legislative consent granted. Relevant documents:3rd Report from the Constitution Committee, 7th and 11th Reports from the Delegated Powers Committee.
1: Clause 2, page 2, line 13, leave out from “directions” to end of line 15 and insert “in particular circumstances involving a risk to national security interests.”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new Clause (Vendor-related directions), and on my amendments to Clause 43.
1: Clause 2, page 2, line 13, leave out from “directions” to end of line 15 and insert “in particular circumstances involving a risk to national security interests.”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my new Clause (Vendor-related directions), and on my amendments to Clause 43.
My Lords, I will also speak to the other amendments in my name. As I said in Committee, the decision to introduce these amendments has not been taken lightly. This Government will act on matters of national security, which is what this package seeks to protect, when vendors with links to third countries, with the intent and capability to cause harm, put our services and the citizens who use them at risk. Through such vendors, a third country can gain access to or control of critical systems, cause disruption to UK national infrastructure and undertake surveillance through access to data at scale or espionage through access to sensitive information.
This package of amendments, supported by guidance and a voluntary referral scheme, provides operators and the Government with the tools to mitigate these risks. The new power also supports the Bill’s existing powers of direction, enabling government to act before and after vendors become embedded in supply chains. I thank noble Lords for their valuable and productive engagement on this topic since this group of amendments was debated in Grand Committee. I also thank my officials and NCSC colleagues for hosting a technical briefing for Peers. In response, I have made several updates to the amendments.
In Committee, the issue was raised that the drafting referred to the Secretary of State and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. This was purely to recognise that a Crown Minister is not a Secretary of State, should they ever need to exercise the powers. Let me be clear: these powers will sit with the DCMS Secretary of State. The DCMS Select Committee can provide oversight and scrutiny of the use of these powers, where appropriate. As such, we have revised the wording of the amendments to remove all reference to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for setting out the Government’s revised framework on national security directions, and I thank her and her officials for their engagement since Committee. In Grand Committee, when 65 government amendments were introduced at the 11th hour, we on these Benches made it clear that, while we fully recognise the acute geopolitical threats posed by hostile states and compromised supply chains, we cannot countenance sweeping executive market interventions devoid of statutory safeguards and judicial oversight. I welcome the genuine concessions the Minister has made following our cross-party discussions, specifically removing the emergency “made affirmative” procedure so that bringing entities into scope is subject to draft affirmative parliamentary scrutiny. However, as set out in our Amendments 117, 118, 119, 145, 146, 147 and 167, the Government’s revised framework still lacks the vital procedural guardrails needed to make these powers safe, workable and, in our view, compliant with the rule of law.
Amendment 117 would require national security directions to rest upon a credible evidential base, an assessment of less disruptive alternatives, and a strict test of necessity and proportionality. Amendment 118 would require that affected suppliers be given prior notice and a meaningful opportunity to propose risk mitigations before their technology is banned or ripped out, protecting essential services from sudden operational collapse. Crucially, Amendments 119 and 146 would introduce independent judicial oversight. Where an order imposes enduring or irreversible restrictions, such as stripping equipment out of live infrastructure, it would have to be authorised by a court with closed material procedures under the Justice and Security Act 2013, ensuring that sensitive intelligence can be scrutinised safely.
My Lords, I too thank the Minister for reintroducing this group and kicking off what will no doubt be a productive Report. I will be brief, both on this and on future groups, because we have already debated many of these topics at length in Committee. We appreciate the intent to allow more flexibility to address cyber security concerns, and I am grateful for the reassurances the Minister gave in Committee and since, particularly regarding the limited scope of the mandatory referral scheme; therefore, we do not oppose these amendments. That being said, I recognise the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. It is right that suppliers be given notice, should the situation allow, and that the use of the powers be overseen and scrutinised where possible. I hope the Minister will confirm that there are mechanisms already in place for these concerns come the implementation of the new regime.
Amendment 164 is in my name and the names of my noble friend Lord Markham and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool. We still consider the registration, monitoring and management of foreign powers a central concern regarding cyber security. I will not revisit at length the arguments so clearly set out by my noble friend Lord Markham in Committee, but I will once again note that foreign states are responsible for three-quarters of attacks on our critical national infrastructure. There is still an information gap regarding foreign threats, and this amendment would bring that much-needed transparency.
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For the avoidance of doubt, this would not require the publication of sources, substance or method. Parliament would know simply that a designation had occurred and a subsequent review had been undertaken. I believe this matter to be of pressing importance and therefore, when Amendment 164 is called, we will seek to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, I would like to join with the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and the noble Lord, Lord Markham. I have, as has been indicated, signed their amendment, but I echo also what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has said about the way in which the Minister has gone about dealing with the Bill.
Noble Lords will be glad to know that I will not be speaking on other groups of amendments, other than one. That gave me a very good insight into the way that the noble Baroness, Lady Lloyd, goes about things. We had three separate meetings in the Recess; she has been exemplary in the way that she has tried to deal with the arguments and with Members of your Lordships’ House and I want to put on record my gratitude to her for that.
So why have I signed Amendment 164? Part 4 of the Bill rightly equips the Secretary of State with formidable powers to issue directions in the interests of national security. Yet, as the Bill stands, those powers risk operating in a strategic vacuum. If we are to empower Ministers to intervene decisively to protect our essential services and our critical supply chains, that intervention must be anchored to an objective, statutory assessment of who threatens us. We cannot defend what we value against an adversary whom we refuse to formally identify. Amendment 164 provides that essential statutory spine by establishing a clear, maintained register of foreign powers that pose an acute risk to our critical network and information systems—something that came home to us last week when so many of our systems nationally were attacked. We do not necessarily know by whom, but we can no doubt guess.
I thank noble Lords for their interventions and constructive debate on this group. I will start by addressing the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the assurances sought by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose.
On the question of safeguards and guardrails, the noble Lord and I are coming from the same place. The vendor-related amendments I have tabled have clear statutory tests. The Secretary of State can give a direction only if two conditions are met. First, they must consider that a risk to national security arises, or could arise, from an operator’s use of a vendor’s goods, services or facilities, and, secondly, the direction is necessary and its requirements are proportionate.
The Secretary of State must consider whether other, less excessive measures would address the risk. Other regimes work the same way. We have designed the framework so that risks are managed early, through non-statutory guidance and voluntary referral routes. We want to avoid, as far as possible, costly interventions such as replacing embedded vendors.
On the question of notices and representations, I agree that operators and vendors should have a say before a direction is given. That is why my amendments require the Secretary of State to consult both the operator and the vendor before giving a direction, unless doing so would be contrary to national security.
I do not think a fixed period for representations in primary legislation is the right approach. Instead, my amendments include a delegated power for the Secretary of State to set statutory timelines in secondary legislation for deciding whether to give a direction. Under this approach, we must consult operators, vendors and all other stakeholders on what those timelines should be before regulations are made. It gives us the flexibility to amend the timelines through secondary legislation, should we assess that this is necessary.
Amendment 1 agreed.
Clause 9: Managed service providers
Amendment 2
20 of 555 shown
Concern was also raised about parliamentary oversight of the Government’s exercise of these powers. After careful consideration, I have limited the procedure for bringing entities into scope of the national security powers. The amendments in Committee enabled these powers to be exercised through the “made affirmative” procedure in an emergency scenario. The revised drafting removes the ability to use the “made affirmative” procedure, relying instead on the draft affirmative procedure. This means both Houses must approve any regulations made under these powers before they take effect.
I have also heard noble Lords’ representations on behalf of businesses and the importance of involving them in decision-making. While the Government do not intend to exercise the power to introduce a mandatory scheme, I understand the reassurance being sought around consultation and oversight. The amendment already requires the Secretary of State to consult in a manner they deem appropriate, but I am willing to go further and commit now to undertake a public consultation ahead of any consideration to introduce a mandatory referral mechanism.
Additionally, I would like to explain one further change that I have made to the amendments since Committee. The amendments no longer include a statutory duty for regulators or the Secretary of State to notify an entity when they have been brought into scope of the vendor direction power. As part of the review of these powers, it has become clear that the statutory duty is not a helpful addition and could delay mitigation of a national security threat. In-scope entities will still be informed. Ahead of making regulations to bring entities into scope of the vendor-related powers, the Secretary of State must consult relevant persons in so far as is practical. This is likely to involve consultation with the regulators and industry groups before bringing forward regulations using the draft affirmative procedure.
The Government will encourage entities to make use of the non-statutory guidance and voluntary referral route once made into law. The Secretary of State must also consult recipients and the vendor before issuing a direction, unless doing so would be contrary to national security. All of this means it is highly unlikely that an organisation would ever find out they are in scope of the vendor risk management framework by receiving a direction, having had no prior engagement with government. We intend to consult on the implementation of the wider vendor risk management framework in due course. This will include the criteria for referral and how the mechanism will work in practice. I hope noble Lords will support these amendments. I beg to move.
Further, Amendment 145 would guarantee an ongoing right of review and renewal, while Amendment 147 would mandate aggregate parliamentary reporting on the economic and operational impact of these directions. Amendment 167 would ensure that these safeguards take effect concurrently with the direction powers themselves. We also strongly support Amendment 164, in the names of the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and the noble Lord, Lord Markham, which would create a transparent register of hostile state actors.
National security and procedural justice are not opposing forces. An executive power to direct private entities to dismantle digital contracts or hardware, backed by severe financial penalties and non-disclosure gagging orders, is an extraordinary power. It will command confidence and withstand legal challenge only if it is anchored in objective criteria and independent judicial scrutiny. I urge the Minister to incorporate these essential safeguards.
We certainly know that, in the past, everything from the National Health Service onwards has been subjected to attacks: in that case the NHS was attacked by the regime in North Korea. Critically, this is not a political blacklist, though. It is not subject to diplomatic whim; it is an intelligence-led mechanism rooted in the hard, objective assessments of GCHQ. Where our intelligence agencies have confirmed that a foreign state or its proxies have perpetrated attacks against our essential services within the last seven years, or where they issue clear warnings of imminent peril, that state must be listed.
The definition must be clear-eyed about modern authoritarian governance. In the People’s Republic of China, for instance, the state, the military and the Chinese Communist Party are inextricably fused. To assess state-backed cyber threats while ignoring the governing political party that directs them would be wilful blindness. This amendment closes that semantic loophole once and for all.
Furthermore, Amendment 164 demands that we confront our own domestic vulnerabilities. It requires the Secretary of State to review not merely attacks launched from across oceans but the profound risks inherent in foreign-owned or foreign-controlled infrastructure situated on our own soil. For far too long, across successive Administrations, our critical national infrastructure has been treated with commercial naivety rather than strategic discipline. By requiring the Government to conduct this review and lay a coherent action plan before Parliament within six months, this amendment ends the era of bureaucratic drift.
Let me end by referring to the inquiry that I chaired on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. It was an inquiry into transnational repression. Our domestic policy’s failure is illustrated by the reluctance of the Government to act on the recommendation that the committee made unanimously to place the People’s Republic of China, which we found to be the state that was the most responsible for transnational repression in the United Kingdom, even more than Russia or Iran, in the foreign influence registration scheme’s top tier. Unlike with those two other countries, we have failed to do so.
I would be grateful when the Minister comes to reply if she is able to give us any information about whether Mr Dan Jarvis, who is responsible for security issues and who promised to continue to keep this issue under review, has done anything further to act on our committee’s recommendations and also the concerns raised by the Intelligence and Security Committee, which the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, has often spoken about in your Lordships’ House.
Strategic ambiguity, which is what I think has been the order of the day, does not deter authoritarian regimes; it merely invites opportunistic aggression. If we are serious about building genuine national cyber resilience, we must replace vague administrative discretion with an empirical, transparent and accountable framework, and I urge the Government to embrace this vital measure and to accept Amendment 164 in the names of the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and the noble Lord, Lord Markham.
On judicial authorisation, I must be clear: the Government cannot accept a requirement for a court to authorise a direction before it is given. These are national security judgments, informed by advice from the intelligence community. They are rightly made by the Secretary of State, who is accountable to Parliament. That does not mean there is no judicial oversight. Operators, and in most cases vendors, will be able to challenge directions and enforcement decisions by judicial review in the High Court.
On review and renewal, I understand that the noble Lord wants directions to expire after a fixed period. I do not think this is wise. A direction must be necessary and proportionate when it is given, and the same applies when it is varied. Businesses also need certainty and not frequent reviews. This approach follows established precedent under the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 and the National Security and Investment Act 2021. The requirements on what a direction must contain also limit its scope. In practice, this means that directions are likely to be tied to specific procurement decisions and mitigations, not ongoing reporting requirements.
On reporting, I agree that Parliament should be able to see how these powers are used. I am proposing that the Secretary of State must lay an annual report before Parliament setting out how the power has been used. The Secretary of State must also publish a notice when the direction is given, varied or revoked, unless this would unreasonably harm national security or commercial interests. This follows the National Security and Investment Act model. For these reasons, I hope the noble Lord and the noble Viscount will feel reassured that the safeguards they seek are built into the framework and that they will not press their amendments.
Turning to Amendment 164, let me be clear that this Government are serious about protecting our essential services from hostile states; it is a central tenet of the Bill and the amendments I have tabled. However, I disagree with the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, that a register of foreign powers aids us in that objective. Indeed, this House had that debate during passage of the Telecommunications (Security) Act, where it was agreed that a country-specific approach is not appropriate. A register can create false certainty. National security threats do not come solely or consistently from a fixed group of foreign powers; for example, a company acting with hostile intent may have close ties to a hostile state while being registered elsewhere. Hostile actors evolve and adapt, so we must focus on identifying and mitigating the risk itself, rather than maintaining a list of countries. Our assessment of risk will always be led by expert security advice, and it should not be constrained by an arbitrary list. However, I understand the important points made about clarity and information on where our threats are coming from. The NCSC annual report highlights the risks posed by foreign actors, and we work with it to mitigate those risks. The report clearly articulates the cyber threats from Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, as well as cyber criminals. I hope that also addresses the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Alton.
I take the points from the noble Viscount and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about addressing the information gap and providing businesses with information. That is exactly why the vendor risk framework will be underscored by guidance. This will support businesses to conduct an informed risk assessment of their supply chains, rather than cutting out countries on a list, which would have economic impacts without addressing the national security risks—the worst of both worlds. There is, and has always been, a delicate balance between national security and economic and diplomatic co-operation. An arbitrary list cuts across this. A case-by-case risk assessment, using guidance and based on expert security advice, is the only sensible way to do it.
To address the question from the noble Lord, Lord Alton, about further deliberations by the Government on his committee’s report, I will write to him with an update following this debate.
I am grateful to noble Lords for this debate. I believe that we share the same aims: decisions about vendors should be evidence-based, proportionate and open to proper scrutiny. I hope I have provided reassurance that the vendor risk management framework provides these safeguards through its statutory tests, the duty to consult, judicial review and reporting to Parliament.